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This note provides a general background of the 
main features of Labor Regulation in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region.  
As part of an effort to understand employability 
constraints in the MENA, a World Bank team 
compiled information on available labor laws 
and other legal acts concerning labor regulation 
in the region. Within the broader scope of labor 
regulation,  and in  order to assure regional 
comparability, information collected focuses on 
key issues in the labor law associated with 
commencing or terminating employment and 
during the period of employment (including 
maternity benefits). The main sources the data 
are the World Bank Doing Business 2010 and 
ILO databank. This note is a tool to provide 
policymakers and international  organizations 
with a regional  diagnose  of how labor 
regulation affects labor market outcomes  in 
MENA and inform client governments about 
strategic approaches to employment creation 
through labor policy and reform.  This activity 
comes as a response to regional priorities in the 
context of the Arab World Initiative (AWI). One 
of the six strategic themes of the AWI focuses 
explicitly on employment creation as a top 
priority. Part of the World Bank’s mandate 
under the AWI is to inform client governments 
about strategic approaches to employment 
creation through labor policy and reform.  
 
Labor market indicators in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA)  region are lagging by 
international benchmarks.  Labor market 
outcomes are a primary concern to policy 
makers in the MENA region.  Employment rates 
in MENA are low by international benchmarks 
(at 46 percent vs. a world average of 60.3 
percent in 2008), mainly due very low 
employment and participation rates among 
women. Unemployment  rates are  high  (at 10 
percent vs. a World Average of 6 percent in 
2008)  mainly due to high rates of 
unemployment among youth (new – and often 
educated – entrants to the labor market) and 
women. Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs) 
– which display very large youth bulk – will need 
to create more than 1,500,000 additional jobs 
per year over the next 10 years in order to 
provide employment opportunities for new 
labor market entrants and to keep the (already 
very high) number of unemployed unchanged. 
Doing so would require rates of economic 
growth surpassing those achieved in recent 
years (which is rather challenging given the 
current world and regional economic context). 
Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries, still 
highly dependent on oil-related revenues; face 
several challenges due to migration inflows, a 
public sector that cannot create at the pace of 
labor supply, and low quality job creation that is 
not attractive for nationals.  
 
Labor regulation,  among other factors, 
introduces  restrictions to employability in 
MENA. Labor market outcomes are influenced 
by a series of demand and supply side factors 
such as macroeconomic performance, 
investment climate, labor market policies and 
institutions, education and skills, labor 
regulation,  and safety nets for workers (see 
World Bank, 2007 for a discussion on the MILES 
framework).  Within this broader framework, 
this note this policy note focuses on the role of 
labor regulation in labor market integration in 
MENA  within other existing institutional and 
macroeconomic constraints (such as labor 
insufficient labor demand, and lagging 
investment, among others).  Data from 
enterprise surveys indicates that in some MENA 
countries labor regulation is perceived as an 
important constraint to business environment 
(and thus, to employment creation). In some 
countries (mainly Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and 
Egypt), labor regulation is perceived by firms as 
a major constraint, while in other countries like 
Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and West Bank and 
Gaza this is true to a lesser extent (Figure ES.1). 
In Egypt for example, according to the 2008 
Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) survey, 
labor regulations and mandatory contributions 
continue to constrain many enterprises from 
expanding formal employment.  Manufacturing 4 
 
firms, service firms, and hotels in Egypt report 
they would hire a net of 21 percent, 9 percent, 
and 15 percent more workers respectively if 
there were no restrictions to hiring and firing 
workers  (Angel-Urdinola et al 2010). In the 
Lebanon 2009 ICA, almost all firms indicate that 
they would hire more workers (by an average of 
more than one third of their current workforce) 
in the absence of existing regulations and 
restrictions. On the other side of the spectrum, 
labor regulation in GCC countries is very flexible 
and thus not perceived as an important 
constraint to business climate or employment 
creation. 
 
Figure ES.1: Share of Firms Identifying Labor 
Regulations as a Major Constraint do Doing 
Business 
 
Source: World Bank 2010 at: www.enterprisesurveys.org 
 
Labor  regulation not only protects workers’ 
rights, but also determines to some extent the 
flexibility in the labor market.  Labor law – 
broadly speaking –  regulates interactions 
between employers, employees, and between 
their representative organizations: unions  and 
employers’ associations.  Besides regulating 
employment relationships between employers 
and employees, labor law serves as a 
mechanism to establish a more conducive 
environment for the creation of productive 
employment opportunities and enhancement of 
social dialogue. International experience 
confirms that, among many other factors, labor 
regulation constitutes an important 
cornerstone for a favorable investment climate, 
which in turn is a key determinant of foreign 
direct investment flows and  employment 
creation in the labor market (affecting 
particularly youth and women).  Despite  a 
considerable  stock of literature on labor 
regulation  and its effect on labor market 
outcomes, there is little systematic analysis on 
these topics in the MENA region.  
 
In  many MENA countries, labor legislation is 
shaped by specific features of the social 
contract established in the post independence 
era. Each of the MENA countries has its own 
history of labor law development, with differing 
labor market conditions and contrasting legal 
and social security systems.  Specific core 
attributes of the social contract in MENA 
traditionally  include a preference for 
redistribution and equity in economic and social 
policy; a preference for states over markets in 
managing national economies; reliance on state 
planning in determining economic priorities; 
and an encompassing vision of the role of the 
state in the provision of welfare and social 
services. In several MENA countries, the main 
labor law dates back in the 1970s (Bahrain 
1976),  or even 1960s (Kuwait 1964, Lebanon 
1964). Increased exposure to international 
market forces has had an impact on labor 
relations in MENA region and some countries 
(such as Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Oman, 
Saudi  Arabia, and West Bank Gaza) have 
recently revised their labor codes to better 
adapt to international trade, to enhance labor 
mobility, and to attract foreign direct 
investment. 
 
In  most  MENA  countries, labor regulation 
constitutes a main mechanism to protect 
worker’s rights as collective bargaining is not 
widespread. Depending on the country, trade 
unions in MENA are either state-controlled or 
independent, but they rarely represent many 
workers effectively (although there are 
exceptions, like in Tunisia where unions are 
influential social partners). Unionized MENA 
countries generally have a single, often 
compulsory, trade-union structure. In many 


































and workers have few ways of challenging the 
power of the state or private employers. In this 
context, the role of the main labor law as 
safeguard for workers is much more essential 
than, for example, in OECD countries where the 
majority of workers are somehow covered by 
collective arrangements. Countries with higher 
levels of collective bargaining generally rely on 
flexible  employment protection legislation 
(EPL), thus providing a greater role for trade 
unions and employers associations to 
determine employment relations. Most MENA 
countries are far from this concept, which partly 
explains why labor codes tend to include an 
over-protective regulation, especially 
concerning firing workers.  
 
Hiring and Firing 
 
Hiring regulation in MENA is overall aligned to 
international standards.  MENA countries in 
general do not display strict hiring regulations 
as compared to international standards, 
although some of them do. Most MENA 
countries have quite flexible arrangements in 
their labor laws as far as fixed term labor 
contracts are concerned. Many workers in 
MENA work overtime to earn extra income, but 
overtime arrangements are often abused by 
employers as legal arrangements and provisions 
(such as payments of wage premiums for night 
work and overtime) are often bypassed to the 
benefit of the  employer. In terms of annual 
leave, regulation in most MENA countries is 
rather generous for international benchmark, 
which is partly explained by the benefit 
packages offered to public servants. Most 
MENA countries offer some form of maternity 
protection; but benefits are not generous by 
international standards. An important aspect of 
maternity leave provisions is who bears the 
costs. In most MENA countries, it is the 
employer who has to cover direct and indirect 
costs. Due to direct and indirect costs to 
employers, an extensive usage of such 
entitlements may lead to restrictions in the 
hiring of potential mothers. In some countries 
in the region, such as in Algeria, Iraq, and 
Morocco, the cost of maternity benefits is 
covered by the social security system. Although 
in such situations the employer does not bear 
direct costs for maternity leave, it also does 
cause inconveniences associated with the need 
to find a replacement for the female worker, or 
to secure a workplace upon the worker’s return.  
 
Figure ES.2: Difficult of Firing and Hiring 
[MENA vs. Other World Regions] 
 
Source: Doing Business 2010 databank 
 
Compared to international benchmarks, firing 
regulations in MENA are rather strict.  Firing 
regulations in MENA (and especially in non GCC 
countries)  remain quite strict and firing costs 
remain high (Figure ES.2). While the 
termination of workers due to redundancy is 
legally authorized in all MENA countries, most 
countries have complex regulations that require 
notification, justification, and approval for 
dismissals. In some countries, employers are 
even required to comply with stipulated 
obligations to reassign and/or retrain workers 
after termination. Furthermore, firing costs 
involving notice requirements, severance 
payments, and penalties due when terminating 
a redundant worker, are rather high in most 
countries in the region. Protective firing 
regulation is partially explained by the lack of 
unemployment insurance schemes in most 
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Despite protective regulation, most workers in 
MENA remain largely  unprotected against 
unemployment risks. Even though labor 
legislation  in MENA might is rigid de jure, de 
facto it is widely evaded.  Employment 
protection in many MENA countries only applies 
to elite of workers in the public and private 
sectors. As such, despite the existence of 
rigid/protective  labor laws, labor markets  in 
MENA remain largely  unregulated (and thus 
quite flexible in nature). There are two 
important factors contributing to this:  
 
(a)  Labor legislation primarily affects hired 
employment in the formal sector:  The typical 
country in MENA produces about 27 percent of 
its GDP and employs 67 percent of its labor 
force informally  (Loayza and Wada, 2009). As 
such, the application of the labor law in many 
cases is limited to civil service, public service 
and a small number of private formal sector 
firms, many of which are multinationals. 
Especially in oil rich countries, the share of 
foreign labor –  often informal and thus less 
protected - is especially high. 
 
(b)  Law enforcement remains weak in most 
countries:  While  laws may be applied and 
enforced differently in different countries, in 
meny MENA countries, law provisions are often 
not complied. Regulations designed to protect 
workers, such as the establishment of minimum 
wages and regulation for overnight work, are 
often bypassed in the benefit of the employer. 
Compliance of firing regulations (such as 
severance payments) is limited outside the 
public sector as employers use various practices 
to avoid payments (including forcing workers to 
sign undated “voluntary” resignations when 
starting a job).  
 
Achieving greater labor market flexibility 
through non-enforcement of laws is not an 
optimal choice because it undermines the rule 
of law, exposes firms to costly uncertainty, 
impedes decent formal employment growth 
and leaves workers without adequate 
protection  (Rutkowski and Scarpetta,  2005). 
Many MENA countries need to develop modern 
Labor Inspectorates to effectively enforce core 
worker rights, to supervise the implementation 
of labor regulations and to provide technical 
assistance and advisory services to enterprises. 
Furthermore, lack of public awareness on legal 
rights associated with employment may also 
impair the enforcement of the law in a number 
of MENA countries. Workers should know their 
legal rights and how to enforce them. 
 
At the same time, protective labor regulation 
in MENA (especially concerning worker’s 
dismissal) is hindering employment creation in 
the private sector, as indicated above (Figure 
ES.1).  International evidence suggests that 
stricter employment protection legislation (i.e. 
requirements/cost of hiring and firing) is 
associated with higher levels of informality and 
youth/female unemployment, lower 
productivity, and slow labor market adjustment 
after economic shocks.  Also,  Strict EPL for 
workers in the “formal” sector has generally 
been shown to restrict employment growth.  
Many economists argue that stricter EPL leads 
to segmentation in the labor market between 
the so-called insiders (i.e. the workers with a 
protected job) and the outsiders (i.e. people 
who are either unemployed or employed with 
fixed-term, part-time or temporary contracts). 
In the case of MENA, on top of high firing cost 
and strict dismissal requirements, regulation in 
many countries (mainly non-GCC) include 
provisions in the regulation that may make it 
more expensive (or constrained) for employers 
to hire women, such as generous maternity 
protection benefits and annual leave, especially 
if paid directly by the employer. Annual leave in 
most MENA countries is rather generous for 
international benchmarks,  which is partly 







Economic efficiency and worker protection 
could be achieved if governments set as an 
overarching goal “to protect the income of 
workers as opposed to protect particular jobs” 
through, for instance,  the expansion of 
unemployment insurance schemes.  An 
appropriately designed unemployment 
insurance scheme can provide adequate 
protection to workers in the context of a more 
flexible labor market. At the same time, only a 
few countries in MENA region have 
unemployment insurance (UI) systems, namely, 
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Kuwait. Even in 
countries with UI systems in place – like Egypt – 
the system hardly exists. The factors 
contributing to the low utilization are  lack of 
public awareness about UI benefits among plan 
members, restrictive eligibility conditions, the 
difficulty of (and the stigma attached to) 
documenting a “just-cause” firing decision, and 
low overall lay-off risk among covered open-
ended contract employees.  
A reform in labor regulation in MENA must go 
hand in hand with a reform in the social 
protection system. Adopting a lifecycle 
approach to work may require shifting from the 
concern to protect particular jobs to a 
framework of support for employment security 
including social support, unemployment 
insurance,  and active measures to assist 
workers during periods of transition. As such, 
any reform to EPL should be adopted in parallel 
to reforms of other social protection policies 
that support laid-off  workers and workers in 
transition between jobs  and other  vulnerable 
groups – in order to preserve social cohesion 
and stability. Finally, any reform in EPL should 
also consider the specificities of the political 
economy in each country, institutional capacity, 
fiscal constraints, and policy preferences as set 
in the social contract. Unions in MENA – some 
of which still have strong political leverage) 
continue to favor the status-quo as defined by 
the post-independence social contract, making 
labor reform a rather complex and far-reaching 
political process.     
   8 
 
 
CHAPTER I.  Labor Regulation in MENA: An Overview  
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the main features of the labor law in MENA and discusses its 
importance as a mechanism to regulate employment relationships between employers and employees, 
protect workers, and establish a more conducive environment for the creation of productive employment 
opportunities.  Labor laws in MENA are of especial importance in regulating labor markets as collective 
bargaining is not very widespread and collective agreements are relatively weak. While labor law in 
many MENA countries (especially in non-GCC countries) seems rather strict for international standards 
(especially concerning employment protection, hiring, and termination), in practice, employment laws 




1.  Labor law – broadly speaking – regulates interactions between employers, employees, and 
between their representative organizations: unions and employers’ associations.  The main labor law 
(generally found in the National Labor Code) provides only a set of minimum legislative requirements 
that employers and employees must comply with for commencing or terminating employment and 
during the period of employment. However, labor law is only one in a set of other labor market 
regulations and institutions (such as labor taxation, other legislative acts, internal regulations, and/or 
collective agreements) that provide supplementary guarantees to workers. Labor laws are, inter alia, 
designed to equalize the bargaining power between employers and employees. They prohibit employers 
and unions from engaging in specified "unfair labor practices" and establish obligations for both parties 
to engage in good faith collective bargaining. Labor laws aim to protect workers from arbitrary, unfair, 
or discriminatory actions by their employers while addressing potential market failures stemming from 
insufficient information and inadequate insurance against risk. Labor law, which governs subordinate 
employment, is based on the need to protect the worker, who is regarded – legally and socially – as 
being in the weaker bargaining position.  
 
2.  Labor law aims to balance the need to protect workers’ rights with the need to increase 
flexibility in the labor market. Besides regulating employment relationships between employers and 
employees, labor law serves as a mechanism to establish a conducive environment for the creation of 
productive employment opportunities and enhancement of social dialogue. International experience 
confirms that, among many other factors, labor regulation constitutes an important cornerstone for a 
favorable investment climate, which in turn is a key determinant of employment creation in the labor 
market (and of foreign direct investment flows) (World Bank 2009) (Box I.1). In the last two decades, 
labor law (especially on employment protection, hiring, and termination) has been hotly debated in 
OECD countries because  of its  potentially important implications for economic and labor market 
performance (see OECD 1999 and 2004 for an overview).  9 
 
Employment Protection Legislation 
 
3.  Within the broader legislative provisions of the labor Law, this policy note analyzes mainly 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). EPL refers to all types of measures concerning hiring (e.g. 
rules favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, training 
requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated pre-notification periods and severance 
payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-time work schemes). A rigid EPL may 
also promote incentives for the creation of a two-tier labor market divided between so-called insiders 
(i.e. the workers with a protected job) and the outsiders (i.e. people who are either unemployed or 
employed with fixed-term, part-time, or temporary contracts) (EC 2003). This occurs because, in theory, 
strict EPL makes it harder for certain groups (including women and displaced older workers) to enter or 
re-enter the labor market, at least on an open-ended contract. As a result, stricter EPL increases long-
term unemployment, and makes layoffs more lengthy; costly; and difficult for employers (Young, 2003). 
Lazear (1990) was the first to find a positive (negative) association between more protective EPL and 
unemployment (employment) rates.  Grubb and Wells (1993) built the first composite EPL indicator by 
identifying several dimensions of EPL and assigning scores to them. The authors found that stricter EPL is 
associated with lower employment stocks. Since then, many other authors have studied the association 
on EPL and labor market outcomes, originating a debate that remains ongoing as it will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
 
Box I.1: Main Factors that Promote a Favorable Investment Climate 
 
  Fundamental institutions of a market economy are in place to facilitate economic growth and job creation, 
including, inter alia, well defined and secure property rights; contract enforcement; effective judicial system; 
and reliable public goods, such as safety and order, necessary infrastructure, and good education system;  
  There is macroeconomic stability in the country, including low inflation, and sound monetary and fiscal policy;  
  Business environment is favorable, e.g., rules and regulations are transparent, coherent and stable; taxation 
levels are low, corruption and abuse of power is limited;  
  There exist a competitive product market especially for small private firms which drive employment growth;  
  Employment protection regulation is of limited scope, and labor relations are not be over-regulated. 
 
Source: World Bank (2009) 
 
4.  The impact of EPL in labor market outcomes has been a matter of debate. Many empirical 
studies, most of which have been conducted in OECD countries, have  investigated  the association 
between EPL and employment outcomes. Results in this area remain largely inconclusive. While many 
studies fail to find an association between EPL and employment outcomes (Emerson, 1998; Bertola, 
1990; OECD, 1998; Boeri, 1999), other studies find that a stricter EPL is associated with lower 
employment stocks (Leazar, 1990; Grubb and Wells, 1993; Di Tella and McCulloch, 1998) and flows 
(Emerson, 1988; Jeckman et at, 1996). In a recent attempt to provide more conclusive evidence, 
Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2008) built a cross-country dataset obtained from an international fast-food 
chain (2,500 outlets in 43 countries). The authors find that (within their sample) formal employment to 
population ratios were about 12 percent lower in countries with more rigid labor regulation. 10 
 
Nevertheless, other studies have also found a positive association between stricter EPL and employment 
flows (Boeri, 1999).  
 
5.  Stricter EPL is associated with higher levels of informality and unemployment. Botero et al 
(2004) provides a cross-country study on labor regulation and its influence on unemployment outcomes. 
The report investigates the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and 
social security laws in 85 countries. The main finding is that heavier regulation of labor is associated with 
lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. Furthermore, stricter 
EPL has been found to be statistically associated with a lower turnover in the labor market, a greater 
prevalence of temporary jobs,  and longer  unemployment spells (Scarpetta 1996; Nickell, 1997; 
Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta, 1998; Bertola, Boeri and Cazes 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; 
Nickell and Layard, 2000; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Young 2003; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005; 
Allard 2005; Bassanini and Duval 2006; Amable et al  2007). Empirical evidence has also documented the 
association between strict EPL and informality, especially in countries with limited enforcement capacity 
and with a higher share of self-employment (Grubb and Wells 1993; Djankov and Ramalho 2009). 
 
6.  Stricter EPL is also associated with lower productivity and slow labor market adjustment after 
economic shocks. By discouraging hiring and firing, EPL may slow adjustment to shocks and impede the 
reallocation of labor, with potentially negative implications for productivity growth and adaptation to 
technological change. Empirical results from OECD countries also suggest that more strict dismissal 
regulations have a negative impact on productivity growth in industries where layoff restrictions are 
more likely to be binding (Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn 2009).  
 
EPL in Developing Countries 
 
7.  While most of the available evidence comes for OECD countries, literature is emerging on the 
impact of EPL in developing countries. Heckman and Pages (2004) systematize the results of 11 studies 
on the effect of labor regulation on employment and growth in Latin America. The main result of the 
study suggests that mandated benefits reduce employment and that job security regulations have a 
substantial impact on the distribution of employment and on turnover rates. The most adverse impact 
of regulation is on employment outcomes of youth and unskilled workers. Insiders and entrenched 
workers gain  from regulation but outsiders suffer  (this  promoting  inequality among demographic 
groups). Pierre and Scarpetta (2004) look at employers’ perceptions on the rigidity of labor regulation in 
80 developing countries. They find that employers’ concerns about labor regulations are closely 
matched by the relative stringency of labor laws. But not all firms are affected in the same way by 
onerous labor regulations. The authors find that labor demand in medium size firms, businesses with 
more prospects for growth, and more innovative firms is more likely to be negatively affected by rigid 
labor regulations. Saha (2006) compares labor regulation in China and India. China’s labor reforms 
(which made wage setting, hiring, and firing more flexible to employers) were to some extent necessary 
for the boom in private sector employment, which then allowed fast industrial growth and rapid 
employment  growth, although they also led to some adverse effects on income distribution and 11 
 
industrial relations. In contrast, India’s reluctance to reform its rigid labor laws significantly depleted the 
favorable effects of industrial deregulation in the formal sector.  
 
8.  Recent analyses suggest that in developing countries rigid EPL retards firm growth and job 
creation (see for example, Boeri et al 2008; Kaplan 2008, and Djankov and Ramalho 2008, and Sanchez- 
Puerta 2010 for an overview of the literature). A recent study on the effects of labor-regulation reform 
using data for over 10,000 firms from 14 Latin American countries revealed that  making labor 
regulations more flexible would lead to an average net increase of 2.1 percent in total employment. 
Firms with fewer than 20 employees would benefit the most, with average gains in net employment of 
4.3 percent. Countries with more regulated labor markets would experience larger gains in total 
employment. These larger gains in total employment, however, would be achieved through higher rates 
of hiring and higher rates of termination (Kaplan 2008). Bosch et al (2007) find that reduced labor 
market flexibility in Brazil led to an increase in informality, primarily due to a reduction in the job finding 
rate in the formal sector. In Egypt for example, according to the 2008 Investment Climate Assessment 
(ICA) survey, labor regulations and mandatory contributions continue to constrain many enterprises 
from expanding formal employment.  Manufacturing firms, service firms, and hotels in Egypt report they 
would hire a net of 21 percent, 9 percent, and 15 percent more workers respectively if there were no 
restrictions to hiring and firing workers (Angel-Urdinola et al 2010) (Figure I.1). In the Lebanon 2009 ICA, 
almost all firms indicate that they would hire more workers (by an average of more than one third of 
their current workforce)in the absence of existing regulations and restrictions. 
Figure I.1: Net employment creation if firing/hiring restrictions were abolished in Egypt. 
 
Source: Angel-Urdinola et al (2010) 
9.  Differences in level of enforcement (e.g., related to the efficiency of a country’s legal system) 
are as important or perhaps more important than differences in the letter of the law (Bertola, Boeri, 
and Cazes, 1999). For example, Almeida and Carneiro (2006) find that Brazilian firms in regions with 
stronger labor law enforcement employ fewer informal workers, even though EPL is the same across all 
regions within the country. However, the authors find that stronger law enforcement in the context of 
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they anticipate high firing costs and/or strict firing regulations. Also, strict EPL may not be complied with 
by employers, especially in countries where enforcement and labor inspections are weak. In Turkey, for 
instance, the severance pay system is quite generous for OECD standards (World Bank, 2006).  In 
practice, compliance of severance regulations is limited outside the public sector as employers use 
various practices to avoid payments (including forcing workers to sign undated “voluntary” resignations 




10.  Developing economies tend to have a stricter EPL in the absence of social protection systems 
against unemployment and poverty risks. EPL is not the only regulation affecting employees hiring and 
firing. Indeed, social protection provisions (such an unemployment benefits, social safety nets for the 
poor, and access to active labor market policies) also exercise an important influence in employer’s 
hiring and firing decisions. Because labor laws have a dual role in the labor market (they provide security 
but at the same time determine labor market flexibility), a new policy concept called “flexicurity” has 
emerged recently, especially among EU countries (Box I.2). Since strict EPL has been found to have 
negative effects on employment outcomes, there is a strong advocacy (especially from employers, 
governments, and foreign investors) for less rigid employment regulation, which implies lower “job” 
protection and easier firing and hiring practices. At the same time, equally strong demand exists 
(especially from employees and unions) for providing security to employees – especially vulnerable 
groups – in order to preserve social cohesion and stability. As such, a balance is needed in order to 




 Figure I.2 indicates that OECD countries have lower levels of employment protection than 
developing countries. This is explained in part by the fact that developing countries generally spend less 
on social security (i.e. unemployment insurance schemes, labor programs targeted to the unemployed 
and social safety nets for the poor and unemployed).  
Box I.2: Flexicurity policies can be designed across four policy components: 
 
•  Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (from the perspective of the employer and the employee, 
of “insiders’ and “outsiders”) through modern labor laws, collective agreements, and work organization; 
•  Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies ensuring that citizens have the opportunity to have high 
quality initial education, that they complete at least their secondary education and that they acquire new 
skills and upgrade existing skills throughout their working lives. It is also about ensuring enterprises 
investing more in human capital and allowing employers to develop their skills; 
•  Effective active labor market policies helping unemployed people return to work through job placement 
services and labor market programs, such as training and job creation. Job search courses and job clubs 
have been shown to be among the most effective measures in helping the unemployed find a job; 
•  Modern social security systems, especially adequate unemployment benefits to act as a safety net when 
people are changing jobs, as well as healthcare benefits in case they fall ill as well as pensions for when 
they retire. 
 
Source: European Commission 2007. 
                                                           
2 In Turkey, workers qualify for severance pay after one year of service, and the system mandates a payment of 
one month wages per year of service for qualifying separations (including separations for economic reasons, just 
cause discharge cases, and retirements), with no ceiling on number of years but a ceiling on amount paid per year. 
3 The concept of Flexecurity has become a key element of the European Employment Strategy (EES) (Klosse, 2003). 13 
 
 
Figure I.2: Employment Protection vs. Social Security (OECD vs. Developing Countries) 
 
Source: Processed from Heckman and Pagés (2004) 
Note: Employment Protection– net present value in monthly wages of dismissal related costs after 20 years of 
employment. Social Security – net present value in monthly wages of workers/firms contributions for life-risks 
related costs (disability, illness, unemployment, old age, etc…) after 20 years of employment 
 
EPL in MENA 
11.  In many MENA countries, EPL is shaped by specific features of the social contract established 
in the post independence era.  There is strong evidence that the origin of a country’s laws is an 
important determinant of its regulatory approach, in labor as well as in other markets (Botero et al 
2004).  Specific core attributes of the social contract in MENA include a preference for redistribution and 
equity in economic and social policy; a preference for states over markets in managing national 
economies; reliance on state planning in determining economic priorities; an encompassing vision of the 
role of the state in the provision of welfare and social services, and other features (World Bank 2004; 
Yousef 2004). In several MENA countries, the main labor law dates back in the 1970s (Bahrain 1976), or 
even 1960s (Kuwait 1964, Lebanon 1964) (see Table A1 in the annex for a description of the main labor 
laws by country). Increased exposure to international market forces has had an impact on labor relations 
in MENA region and some countries (such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Oman, South Arabia, and West 
Bank Gaza) have recently revised their labor codes to better adapt to international trade, to enhance 




12.  In most MENA countries, collective bargaining is not very widespread and collective 
agreements are relatively weak. Unionized MENA countries generally have a single, often compulsory, 
trade-union structure. Depending on the country, trade unions in MENA are either state-controlled or 
independent. Although some Unions in MENA have strong political leverage, they rarely represent many 
workers effectively (as unions represent only a small fraction of the “formal” workforce). In Europe, 
collective bargaining coverage is relatively high, with 70 percent or more of employees being covered by 
                                                           
4 This policy note discusses legal frameworks as of 2009. Any reforms conducted in 2010 may not be reflected in 
the analysis. For example, a new labor law was issued in Syria on April 12, 2010 after four years of negotiations 







































































































collective agreements in the majority of EU countries. In MENA region, by the available data, coverage is 
less than 15 percent in Morocco and in the United Arab Emirates (ILO 2008). In this context, the role of 
EPL as safeguard for workers is much more essential than, for example, in EU15 countries where the 
majority of workers are somehow covered by collective arrangements. Countries with higher levels of 
collective bargaining generally rely on a basic (rather flexible) EPL, thus providing a greater role for trade 
unions and employers associations to determine employment relations. Most non-GCC MENA countries 
are far from this concept, which partly explains why labor codes tend to include an over-protective 
regulation, especially concerning firing protection (see Table A2 in the annex for a description of labor 
laws in the areas of individual and collective labor relations by country). 
 
13.  Although there is a lot of variance in the level of rigidity of labor regulation between countries 
in the region, on average, EPL in MENA appears not too rigid for international standards. A widely use 
source providing international comparisons on the strictness of employment regulation is the Employing 
Workers index (EWI) from the World Bank Doing Business dataset. While this index is far from perfect 
and should be used with care to make policy conclusions on how flexible or rigid labor markets are, it is 
the only source of consolidated data available on labor regulation in MENA. The index oscillates 
between 0 and 100. A higher value of the index suggests more rigidity in the labor law. The index is 
constructed as the average of sub-indexes assessing difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, difficulty of 
firing and firing costs. Figure I.3 plots the EWI for all countries in MENA where data in available and also 
regional averages for benchmarking purposes. 
 
14.  Results in MENA indicate great dispersion in the rigidity of labor law.  The region hosts 
countries with very low EWI (especially among GCC  countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, United 
Emirates, and Kuwait) and very high EWI (especially among Maghreb countries: Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco but also in Djibouti) (Figure I.3). All other MENA countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, 
Iraq, Iran, Syria, and West Bank Gaza) display  a  EWI  that is somehow aligned to international 
benchmarks in other developing regions such as Latin America and South Asia). Nevertheless, non-GCC 














                                                           
5 Detailed information on the methodology used to construct the Employing Worker’s Index can be found in Doing Business’ 
website (http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/) 15 
 
Figure I.3: Doing Business Employing Workers Index [0-100] 
 
Source: Doing Business Dataset 
 
15.  Labor regulation in many non-GCC MENA countries is seen as an important obstacle to hiring 
and firm growth, although the situation varies country by country.  Data from enterprise surveys 
indicate that in some MENA countries labor regulation is perceived as an important constraint to doing 
business. In some countries (mainly Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and Egypt), labor regulation is perceived by 
firms as a major constraint while to a less extent this is true in other countries like Jordan, Algeria, 
Morocco, and West Bank and Gaza. It is interesting that employers in countries with “apparently” more 
rigid labor regulation as, such as Algeria and Morocco (as proxied by the Rigidity of Employment Index in 
Figure I.4) do not identify labor law as a major constraint to doing business as much as in countries with 
“apparently” less rigid labor laws (such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria). This could be explained by the fact 
that labor regulation could be completely bypassed in some countries where enforcement is low. In such 
cases, despite the existence of rigid labor laws, the labor market could be virtually unregulated (and thus 
quite flexible in nature). 
6
                                                           
6 The mismatch between how rigid regulation is and how much it is perceived as a constraint to investment climate 
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Figure I.4: Share of Firms Identifying Labor Regulations as a Major Constraint do Doing Business 
 
Source: World Bank 2010 at: www.enterprisesurveys.org 
 
16.  Nevertheless, employment laws in MENA remain subject to evasion, weak enforcement, and 
fail to reach the large informal sector. As it will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, 
even though labor legislation might be rigid de jure, de facto it is not enforced and is widely evaded. This 
is because labor legislation primarily affects hired employment in the formal sector, although there is 
some evidence of spillover effects to the informal sector. In all of MENA countries, however, informality 
is widespread, and some countries in the region are among the most informal economies in the world 
(Figure I.5).  The typical country in MENA produces about 27 percent of its GDP and employs 67 percent 
of its labor force informally (Loayza and Wada 2009). As such, the application of the labor law in many 
cases is limited to civil service, public service and a small number of private formal sector firms, many of 
which are multinationals. Especially in oil rich countries, the share of foreign labor – often informal and 
thus less protected - is especially high. Also, laws may be applied and enforced differently in different 
countries. For instance, in some countries (Jordan, Egypt), labor regulations in special economic zones 
are applied separately from national labor laws. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in addition to the 
federal labor law, three separate labor laws govern employment relations in free zones providing more 
flexibility to the firms. Achieving greater labor market flexibility through non-enforcement of laws is not 
an optimal choice because it undermines the rule of law, exposes firms to costly uncertainty, impedes 
decent formal employment growth and leaves workers without adequate protection (Rutkowski and 
Scarpetta, 2005). Many MENA countries need to develop modern labor Inspectorates to effectively 
enforce core worker rights, to supervise the implementation of labor regulations,  and to provide 
technical assistance/advisory services to enterprises. Furthermore, lack of public awareness on legal 
rights associated with employment may also impair the enforcement of the law in a number of MENA 
countries. Workers should know their legal rights and how to enforce them. 


































FigureI.5:  Informality Rates in non-GCC Countries in MENA 
 
Source: Loayza and Wada (2009)  
Note: Informality is defined as the share of employment not contributing to a pension scheme.   
 
17.  The majority of countries in MENA have not ratified important ILO conventions. Internationally 
accepted labor standards and norms governing the individual employment contract are recognized in 
ILO Conventions and Recommendations. Seven out of 18 MENA countries have ratified all ILO core 
Conventions (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) but Bahrain and Oman have 
ratified only four out of the eight ILO core conventions.
7
 
  Out of the core conventions, most MENA 
countries have not yet ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention, 1948 (Convention No. 87). As far as the ratification of other ILO Conventions is concerned, 
the countries vary significantly from four conventions ratified by Oman and 6 conventions ratified by 
Qatar to 63 conventions ratified by Egypt and 61 conventions by Iraq (See Annex Table A3). Although 
formally these international documents are binding only to signatories, other non-signatory countries 
are increasingly aligning their labor legislation according to the norms and regulations stipulated in 
these Conventions.  
18.  Any reform in labor regulation in MENA needs to go hand in hand with a reform in the social 
sector; and should take into account fiscal constraints and institutional capacity. Any reform to EPL 
should be adopted in parallel to reforms of other social protection policies that support laid off workers 
and workers in transition between jobs. These social protection policies are far reaching and include 
unemployment benefits or unemployment insurance, old age income support (including health 
insurance and old age pensions), social safety net schemes targeted to the most vulnerable, and active 
labor market programs supporting the unemployed job-seekers. Relaxing EPL implies a threat to job 
security as jobs become less protected. Governments need to  protect workers (who constitute a 
                                                           
7 ILO core conventions include: the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize  Convention, 
1948 (No. 87); the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); the Forced Labor 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29);   the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105); the Minimum Age 
Convention, 1973 (No. 138); the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 (No. 182); the Equal Remuneration 































national public good) against risks of long-term unemployment and displacement. In this regard, there is 
vast evidence indicating that short-term and long-term worker displacement increases poverty and 
inequality, contributes adversely to political instability and crime, and can affect health and mental 
outcomes in the adult population (e.g. Von Wachter and Sulliven 2009 use administrative data from the 
USA to show that the displacement of a 40 year old high seniority male worker is associated with a one 
to one and a half years loss in his life expectancy).  
 
19.  Any reform in EPL should also consider the specificities of the political economy, and policy 
preferences as set in the social contract. EPL reform is likely to face political resistance for various 
reasons (Scarpetta et al 2007 and Duval and Elmeskov 2005). A major political economy consideration 
affecting EPL reform is the balance of powers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the labor market. 
Bentolila et al (2008) consider that a simple indicator for ‘political support’ of EPL reform is the ratio of 
the number of workers under permanent contracts to the sum of all employees and unemployed.  If 
permanent workers constitute more than half, roughly implying that an ‘insider’ is the median voter, 
then their interests will dictate unions' position and drive the resistance towards easing EPL (Box I.3). Of 
course, besides the size of different interest groups, their level of political organization also affects the 
balance of powers. In MENA, factors like globalization, trade, and a more than ever volatile business 
cycle (arising from recent food, financial, and/or oil crises) – are shaping preferences – at least among 
policy makers – towards the establishment of more liberal labor regulation coupled with adequate 
safety nets systems. However,  unions in MENA (some of which still have strong political leverage) 
continue to favor the status-quo as defined by the post-independence social contract, making labor 
reform a rather complex and far-reaching political process.    
 
Box I.3 Political Economy of EPL reform 
 
Governments adopt different strategies to mobilize EPL reform in the light of political economy considerations. 
For instance, reforms that relaxed EPL in European and Latin American countries were ‘sequenced’, in the sense 
that they were enforced marginally, first only for more vulnerable non-permanent workers; a reform which 
seems politically easier to implement. Though politically easier, this creates what is referred to as ‘two-tier’ EPL 
reform, and may exacerbate fragmentation in the labor market. Spain is an interesting case where reforming 
EPL for temporary workers led to an explosion of temporary contracts, which generated concerns about fairness 
and consequently brought about an EPL deregulation for all workers independent of type of contract. Another 
strategy is complementing EPL reform with attractive reforms in other social protection mechanisms including 
the introduction of unemployment benefit schemes, strengthening of active labor market programs to facilitate 
job-search activities, or targeting  safety nets or income support schemes to the most vulnerable. From a 
political economy perspective, ‘packaging’ reforms also implies that more than one interest group will be 
exerting pressure to lobby for the measures they consider advantageous, thus making it more difficult for one 
group to block any single measure within the package of reforms.  
 
Scarpetta et al (2007) also show evidence that product market liberalization can over time weaken workers’ 
bargaining power through easing of EPL, implying that product market reforms can ‘substitute’ as well as a 
‘complement’ labor market reforms. From a policy perspective, this implies that product market deregulation 
can be used as a policy ‘substitute’ for labor market deregulation in case the later is faced by political resistance.  
 
Source : Bentolila et al 2008 ; Duval & Elmaskov 2005 ; Scarpetta et al 2007; Bean 1998; Hoj et al 2006 19 
 
The Policy Note 
20.  This policy note analyzes five main pillars of labor law in MENA related to hiring and firing 
practices: Within the broader scope of labor regulation, this policy note main focuses on key issues in 
the labor law associated with commencing or terminating employment and during the period of 
employment (including a brief discussion on maternity benefits) (Figure I.6). Given its narrow focus, this 
study does not claim to be comprehensive and does not substitute for more and, in some cases, needed 
in-depth analysis of labor regulation on a country by country basis. 
Figure I.6: Main Pillars of Labor Law Discussed in the Context of this Policy Note 
 
 
21.  The main sources the data are the World Bank Doing Business 2010 and ILO databank. To 
compile the Doing Business databank, labor experts are contacted in 183 countries to answer specific 
questions about labor legislation. Doing Business calculations are based on certain assumptions about 
forms and employees. As such, the analysis presented here needs to be interpreted with care as it only 
reflects a sub-sample of the population based on assumptions that are not universal (Box I.4). Finally, 
the policy note’s discussion includes analysis of relevant labor law provisions from EU countries that are 
used benchmarks and are brought forward for comparison. Relevant characteristics of the labor law in 
MENA countries are largely presented in the Annexes.  
Box I.4: Assumption used in Doing Business Databank (DBD) 
 
  The worker: is (i) a 42-year-old, nonexecutive, full-time, male employee; (ii) has worked at the same company 
for 20 years; (iii) earns a salary plus benefits equal to the economy’s average wage during the entire period of 
his employment; (iv) is not a member of a labor union (unless mandatory).  
  The Business: is (i) a limited liability company; (ii) operates in the economy’s largest business city; (iii) is 100 
percent domestically owned: (iv) operates in the manufacturing sector; (v) is a small to medium-size company 
with 60 employees; (vi) is subject to collective bargaining agreements in economies where such agreements 
cover more than half the manufacturing sector and apply even to firms not party to them, and (vii) abides by 
every law and regulation but does not grant workers more benefits than mandated by law, regulation or (if 
applicable) collective bargaining agreement. These assumptions ensure comparability across countries.  
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CHAPTER II.  Hiring Regulations in MENA  
 
This chapter provides an overview of hiring regulations in MENA. Hiring laws regulate the extent to 
which flexible contract types are restricted by law, how expensive it is for firms to hire first time job 
seekers, and the extent to which employers and workers accommodate/allow scheduling of nonstandard 
work hours and paid leave. MENA countries in general do not display strict hiring regulations as 
compared to international standards, although some of them  do. Most MENA countries have quite 
flexible arrangements in their labor laws as far as fixed term labor contracts are concerned. Many 
workers in MENA work overtime to earn extra income, but overtime arrangements are often abused by 
employers as legal arrangements and provisions (such as payments of wage premiums for night work 
and overtime) are often bypassed to the benefit of the employer. In terms of annual leave, regulation in 
most MENA countries is rather generous for international benchmark, which is partly explained by the 
benefit packages offered to public servants. Finally, most MENA countries offer some form of maternity 
protection; but benefits are not generous by international standards. 
 
Difficulty of Hiring 
 
1.  Difficulty of hiring measures the extent to which flexible contract types are restricted by law 
and how expensive it is for firms to hire first time job seekers. With more globalized labor markets and 
a higher participation of women in the labor force, there is a shift towards more flexible work 
organization structures, de-standardization of employment contracts,  and diversification of working 
time arrangements (not only in the informal sector but also in the formal sector as well). These can 
differ significantly from the standard  “full time”  contractual model in terms of the degree of 
employment attachment, income security, and the relative stability of the associated working and living 
conditions. A contract of employment includes many dimensions: it can be concluded for an indefinite 
term, for a fixed term, or for the time of completion of a specified task. Another important dimension 
for hiring is the price of labor, which is often proxied by how the minimum wage for new entrants 
compares with the overall level of wages of the employed population (although the minimum wage is a 
mechanism to provide a benchmark for a minimum living pay, is also used as a proxy for the price of 
low-skilled labor relative to high-skilled labor).  The  policy note  analyzes the two  main  dimensions 
concerning difficulty of hiring practices: how restrictive access to flexible contracts is (applicability and 
duration) and how high the level of the minimum wage is for a first-time job seeker compared to the 
overall level of wages of the employed population. Figure II.1 presents a “difficulty of hiring index” as 
calculated in the Doing Business (2010) databank. The index measures (i) whether fixed-term contracts 
are prohibited for permanent tasks; (ii) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed term contracts; and 
(iii) the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the average value added per 
worker. The index takes values between 0 and 100 with higher values being associated with more 





Box II.1: Computation of the Difficulty of Hiring Index (DHI) 
 
An economy is assigned a score of 1 if fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks and a score of 0 
if they can be used for any task. A score of 1 is assigned if the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term 
contracts is less than 3 years; 0.5 if it is 3 years or more but less than 5 years; and 0 if fixed-term contracts can 
last 5 years or more. Finally, a score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of the minimum wage to the average value 
added per worker is 0.75 or more; 0.67 for a ratio of 0.50 or more but less than 0.75; 0.33 for a ratio of 0.25 or 
more but less than 0.50; and 0 for a ratio of less than 0.25. In Tunisia, for example, fixed-term contracts are not 
prohibited for permanent tasks (a score of 0), and they can be used for a maximum of 48 months (a score of 
0.5). The ratio of the mandated minimum wage to the value added per worker is 0.30  (a score of 0.33). 
Averaging the 3 values and scaling the index to 100 gives Tunisia a score of 28. 
 
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/   
 
2.  MENA countries in general do not display a high Difficulty of Hiring Index as compared to 
international standards,  although  some  Non-GCC  countries do. According to Figure II.1,  Non-GCC 
MENA countries, on average, display a Difficulty of Hiring Index (DHI) similar to that in other developing 
regions such as ECA and Latin America (but slightly higher than that in OCED and South Asia).  The DHI is 
low most East Asia/GCC countries, as well as in Egypt, Iran, Syria, and Jordan; and somehow aligned to 
international standards in Yemen, Tunisia, Iraq, and WBG.  Only in Algeria, Lebanon, Djibouti, and 
Morocco, the DHI is high by regional and international benchmarks.   
 
Figure II.1: Doing Business Difficulty of Hiring Index [0-100] 
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3.  Fixed-term work contributes to making labor markets more flexible but it is also associated 
with lower employment quality. Fixed term work provides a buffer for cyclical fluctuations of demand, 
allowing companies to adjust employment levels without incurring high firing costs.  Fixed-term work 
also allows companies to reap market opportunities by engaging in projects of short duration without 
bearing disproportionate personnel costs. This is especially important in labor markets where 
permanent employment is protected by strict regulations and high firing costs. Fixed-term contracts 
tend to be heavily used to hire young people and other labor market entrants who in general have 
weaker bargaining power (such as the unemployed and/or those with the lowest education levels).  On 
the other hand, especially for these more vulnerable workers, fixed-term work can provide a bridge into 
employment and an opportunity to gain experience and skills. This is especially true for first time 
workers who lack experience and are given an opportunity to be trained and to receive an income. 
However, research has pointed out a number of risks associated with the use  of fixed-term work, 
especially for workers. For instance, fixed-term workers are subject to higher turnover, earn lower 
wages on average, and receive less training (EC 2006).  
 
4.  Regulations governing fixed term contract need to work hand in hand with firing regulations 
to avoid abuses. When firms can easily hire temporary workers under regulatory settings where it is 
costly to dismiss regular ones, firms do not have any incentives to convert workers from temporary to 
permanent contracts (Box II.2). This in turn may adversely contribute to employment quality since, in 
many cases, workers under fixed term contract have limited (or no) access to social security (pension 
programs, health insurance, and/or unemployment insurance). Since temporary contracts can only be 
renewed a limited number of times or have a given duration, temporary workers – mostly young and 
unskilled – may be forced into an endless moves across jobs that provide only temporary contracts.  
 
5.  Most MENA countries have quite flexible arrangements in their labor laws as far as fixed term 
labor contracts are concerned. Only in Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq and Morocco, fixed term contracts are 
prohibited for permanent tasks. About half of all MENA countries have no limits in the duration of fixed 
term contracts (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) while Djibouti, Morocco and Yemen 
have established a limit of 12 months. Other countries have longer limits for the duration of fixed-term 
contract ranging from 24 to 60 months (WBG, Qatar, Jordan, and Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates). In 
Lebanon, no limit in the duration has been established but after 24 months the worker is treated as 
open ended for purposes of severance pay. In Algeria, the law does not specify a maximum time limit, 
but it requires that the duration is specified, otherwise the contract will be considered permanent (see 
Table A4 in the Annex). 
 
6.  Most MENA countries have quite flexible rules for renewing a fixed-term contract beyond the 
original maximum term. About half of the countries in the region have no limits for the renewal of fixed 
term contract (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and United Arab Emirates). Other countries 
limit the number of times or regulate the time span under which fixed term contracts are renewed (e.g. 23 
 
fixed term contracts can be renewed only once  in  Djibouti  and in countries like WBG and Tunisia 
workers cannot work under a fixed term contract for more than 24 months and 4 years respectively).  In 
some countries when fixed term contracts are renewed the contract term will change to open ended 
after a pre-defined time (after the first renewal in Syria, after 24 months in Lebanon for severance pay 
purposes, and after 3 years in Saudi Arabia). Only Morocco prohibits renewal of fixed term contracts 
(see Table A4 in the Annex).  
 
Box II.2: International Best Practices Concerning Fix Term Contracts Regulation 
 
To prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, the EU 
Council  Directive 1999/70/EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work suggests listing in 
national legislation one or more of the following measures: (a) Objective reasons justifying the renewal of such 
contracts or relationships; (b) Maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or 
relationships; (c) Number of renewals of such contracts or relationships.  
 
As far as the duration is concerned, in EU15 countries, the fixed-term contracts vary (with exceptions in some 
countries) from one year in Spain, 18 months in France, two years in Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden, and 
three years in the Netherlands and Portugal. There are no limits on duration in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Ireland and Italy. In Germany, there is no maximum duration for a fixed-term contract with just cause, and two 
years for a fixed-term contract without objective cause. In the UK, there is no limit as well but employees who 
have worked successive fixed-term contracts for a period of four years or more will become permanent 
employees unless the employer can objectively justify the continued use of fixed-term arrangements. In Finland, 
there is no specific maximum duration for fixed-term employment contracts. However, after five years, a fixed-
term contract is subject to the same requirements for termination as an indefinite-term contract. Renewals for 
fixed-term contracts are more restricted, and even in the countries with the most flexible arrangements, as a 
rule, a justification is required. For example, in Belgium, the maximum term of a single fixed-term contract is not 
limited; however, it cannot be renewed without justification based on the nature of the functions or other 
legitimate reasons.  
 




7.  Setting minimum wages is a common practice in many countries.  Countries set minimum 
wages with the intended objective to promote a fair wage structure, to provide minimum acceptable 
standard of livings for low-paid workers,  and  to alleviate poverty. However, if minimum wages (in 
relation to the average wage) are set too high, they can have an adverse impact on employment. In 
setting minimum wages governments (or the bargaining parties) need to reconcile two opposite kinds of 
considerations. On the one hand, there are social consideration of workers needs, standards of living 
and earnings inequality, which lead to the pressure – coming usually from labor unions – to increase the 
minimum wage. On the other hand, there are economic considerations of productivity, competitiveness, 
and job creation, which result in the pressure – usually originating from employers’ organizations – to 
keep the minimum wage at a low level. There are two basic mechanisms for setting the minimum wage. 
First, a statutory minimum wage is set by the government, possibly involving consultations with trade 
unions and employers. Second, minimum wages are determined through collective (tripartite or 
bipartite) negotiations. Collective agreements can set national or sectoral (industry, occupational) 24 
 
minimum wages. In some countries, sectoral collective agreements are extended to employers who 
were not party to the original agreements, and also to workers not belonging to trade unions (Kuddo 
2009). 
 
8.  Several international documents refer to policy recommendations on minimum wages. The 
ILO Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131 (1970) states that the elements to be taken into 
consideration in determining the level of minimum wages shall, so far as possible and appropriate in 
relation to national practice and conditions, include: (a) the needs of workers and their families, taking 
into account the general level of wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits, and the 
relative living standards of other social groups; and (b) economic factors, including the requirements of 
economic development, levels of productivity, and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high 
level of employment. The Convention sets up the following other principles: (i) once established, 
minimum wages have the force of law; (ii) most workers should benefit from the protection of the 
minimum wage although exceptions are possible; (iii) social partners should be fully consulted (not just 
informed); and (iv) Minimum wages should be adjusted from time to time. The OECD 1994 Jobs Strategy 
recommended making wages and labor costs more flexible by introducing sub-minima differentiated by 
age or region and/or indexing them to prices instead of average earnings. Since the chances of being 
employed informally are substantially higher for young workers, introducing a discounted minimum 
wage for youth or those with limited labor market experience, the minimum wage could reduce 
informal employment for this group and improve their job perspectives. In Tunisia, for instance, the 
minimum age rate for juvenile workers is 85 percent of the rate applicable for adults. 
 
9.  About half of all MENA countries do not have a legal minimum wage and, those who do, set 
them with considerable variation in the details. Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, and West Bank and Gaza do not have officially established minimum wages.
8
                                                           
8 For comparison, in 2009, 20 of the 27 Member States of the EU (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the U.K.) and one candidate country (Turkey) had national legislation 
setting statutory minimum wages. 
 
Other countries in the region that do have a legal minimum wage set it with considerable variation in 
the details. This occurs because minimum wage regulations have many dimensions: (i) the level at which 
the minimum wage set; (ii) coverage; (iii) differentiation in the level (e.g., by age, sector, or region); (iv) 
methods of adjusting levels to reflect inflation; (v) how the level is set (e.g., by government or by the 
social partners); (vi) whether it applies to the private and/or public sector; and (vii) sanctions for non-
compliance. In most MENA countries for which the data are available, the government sets the national 
minimum wage, following a period of consultation with the social partners. For example, in Morocco, 
national minimum wage rates are set by the government in close collaboration with representatives 
from employees and employers organizations. In some countries (like Lebanon), the minimum wage 
largely  applies to all workers  (salary and wage-earners in both the public and private sector 
independently of age/gender). In other countries, the minimum wage covers only particular groups of 
workers. For instance, in Algeria, civil and military national defense personnel, magistrates, state 
officials, along with the personnel of public establishments of an administrative nature are not covered 25 
 
by the national minimum wage rate  (separate legislation is enacted concerning these workers). In 
Morocco, the government sets two national minimum wage rates for employees/workers carrying out 
agricultural work and for employees/workers in the industrial and commercial sectors, and in liberal 
professions. In Tunisia, the minimum wage level for young workers is lower than that for adult workers 
(see Table A5 in the annex for a summary of practices in establishing minimum wages in a selected 
group of MENA countries). 
 
10.  Minimum wages are particularly useful in labor markets with low mobility and in cases where 
firms have “monopsonistic” power.  Low labor mobility, especially among low skilled women, 
strengthens the sense of “local” (and non-convergent) labor markets whereby differences in 
employment outcomes across regions are quite large. In Egypt, for example, unemployment rates are 
very different across governorates (e.g. unemployment rates in Luxor/Fayoum/Suhag and are below 5% 
vs. 12% in Cairo and 16% in Dakhalia). Nevertheless, workers – especially women – seem not to move 
from better to worse performer regions in order to seek better job opportunities. These combined 
factors are generally prevalent in labor markets where firms have monopsonistic power. The implication 
of this is that firms may be paying women workers (in the textile industry, for example) below their 
marginal product of labor, which causes the supply of labor to be below that in a competitive setting (a 
feature that may be affecting women disproportionally). Indeed, in some countries like Egypt, Turkey 
and Macedonia, a large share of working women is employed by a few large textile companies. Women 
in the textile industry claim having to accept jobs with very precarious conditions (in terms in pay, 
safety, and working hours) due to lack of alternative employment opportunities (CRPM, 2008). If indeed 
low-educated workers, especially women, face a monopsonistic market; standard economic theory 
would indicate that the introduction of a minimum wage above the monopolistic wage but below the 
competitive market wage would likely increase employment without causing additional unemployment 
(Aaronson et al., 2008; Angel-Urdinola, 2008). 
 
11.  High minimum wages have been found to generate disemployment effects – albeit small in 
aggregate – but significant among less-productive workers. This occurs when the minimum wage is set 
above the marginal product of unskilled labor (Angel-Urdinola, 2007; OECD 1998 and 2006; Brown, 
1999; Neumark and Wascher,  1999; Neumark and Wascher,  2007;  and Boeri and van Ours,  2008). 
Disemployment effects may vary according to a worker’s age, skills, industry and region of employment. 
Young workers may be most vulnerable to job losses under a high level (or a high increase) of the 
minimum wage. International evidence indicated that a 10 percent increase in the level of minimum 
wage would reduce youth employment by a range of 1 to 4 percent. The fall in youth employment may 
sometimes be accompanied by an increase in employment of other groups (e.g. older workers as 
employers substitute away from younger workers who had become relatively more expensive). The 
presence of a youth sub-minimum reduces the negative consequences of the minimum wage for youths. 
 
12.  The level of the minimum wage in Yemen and Morocco is high as compared to average wages, 
which could introduce risks for disemployment effects especially among youth. It is quite challenging 
to make international comparisons in regards to level at which minimum wages are set in order to 
assess whether they are high/low relative to a country’s wage distribution and productivity. This occurs 26 
 
because (i) minimum wages can be set on either an hourly, daily, weekly, or monthly basis, which 
complicates cross-country comparisons, and (ii) comparison between countries in theory would need to 
control for the skill distribution (If a country has a large dispersion in its level of skills then it would have 
a wide dispersion and a lower ratio of minimum wage to mean wage, and vice versa). 
9 Despite these 
caveats, a common measure used to  make  international comparisons on the level at which the 
minimum wage is set is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage. A higher ratio is associated 
with a comparatively higher level of the minimum wage. In MENA, as it is the case in other countries, 
this ratio varies significantly from country to country (Figure II.2). Morocco displays the highest ratio in 
the region (0.72), followed by Yemen (0.60) and Iran (0.47). Egypt displays the lowest ratio in the region 




Figure II.2: Minimum Wage / Average Wages [International Comparisons] 
 
Source: Doing Business Databank and Maloney and Nuñez (2003) 
                                                           
9 In most MENA countries with minimum wages, monthly rate has been established but Morocco uses hourly rate, 
and Iran – both monthly and daily rate (see Table A6 in the Annex). 
10 Due to a lack of consistent cross-country data on average earnings, by the Doing Business methodology, the 
average GNI per capita that is used as a proxy for average earnings. The ratio is adjusted to  represent the 



















































13.  In most MENA countries, sanctions for non-compliance with minimum wage rules – albeit 
regulated – are weakly enforced. Independently of how high/low the minimum wage is relative to 
average wages, the extent to which minimum wage policy affects employment outcomes and the wage 
distribution depends on how much minimum wage is enforced. Although most MENA countries with 
defined legal minimum wage have regulations on enforcement (Table A5 in the Annex), enforcement is 
rather weak, inspections are rare due to a lack of resources, and fines are rarely imposed. To better 
illustrate this claim, Figure II.3 provides useful information about both the level of the minimum wage 
relative to the wage distribution for new labor market entrants in Egypt and Yemen. The figure plots the 
distribution of net hourly wages for wage earners between 18 and 21 years of age who work full time 
(between 30 and 60 hours a week) in the formal and informal sectors. The horizontal line represent the 
level at which the minimum wage is set. Results confirm that, as discussed before, the level at which the 
minimum wage is set in Yemen is higher than that in Egypt: while in Egypt the minimum wage is to the 
left tail of the wage distribution, in Yemen it is very close to the distribution’s mode. However, in both 
countries there is a significant mass of workers earning below the minimum wage, suggesting low levels 
of enforcement. However, the wage distribution for formal workers in Yemen seems quite centered 
(and compressed) around the minimum wage, suggesting that the minimum wage may serve as a 
benchmark wage for new entrants in the formal sector. 
 
Figure II.3: Hourly Wage Distribution and Minimum Wages in Yemen and Egypt 
                           Egypt                        Yemen 
 
Source: Authors using Yemen 2006 Household Budget Survey and Egypt’s 2006 Labor Market Panel Survey. 
Note: The vertical line illustrates the level at which the minimum wage is set.   
 
Rigidity of Work Hours 
 
14.  Rigidity of work hours measures the extent to which employers and workers 
accommodate/allow scheduling of nonstandard work hours and annual paid leave. While many 
workers like to work overtime to earn extra income, overtime arrangements can also be abused by 
employers, especially on-season or during increases in the volume of work. Several international treaties 
deal with minimum standards regarding work time arrangements. The first ILO Hours of Work 
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“Working hours … shall not exceed eight in the day and forty-eight in the week”. The follow-up Forty-
Hour Week Convention No. 47 from 1935 states that each country that ratifies the convention declares 
its approval of the principle of a forty-hour workweek.  Many countries are fixing labor legislation with 
the principle 40-hours as the length of the normal working week (industry) since overtime, including 
wage premiums, does not apply to this period. Annual leave also constitutes an important component to 
measure rigidity of work hours. The length of the allowed worker’s annual leave (and whether or not is 
paid) influences hiring practices, labor turnover, and labor demand. In the context of this policy note, 
rigidity of work hours will be measured by the “Rigidity of Hours Index” (HDI) and calculated in the Doing 
Business (2010) Databank (Box II.3). Results indicate that the HDI in MENA is lower than that in OECD, 
ECA, and Sub-Saharan African, close to that in LAC, and higher than that in South and East Asia. Within 
MENA, the HDI is low in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Kuwait; and somehow aligned to international 
standards in Egypt, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Iran, and Iraq. In Oman, Saudi Arabia, WBG, 
Algeria, Djibouti, and Morocco, the DHI is high for regional and international benchmarks (suggesting 
more rigid regulation) (Figure II.4). 
 
Figure II.4: Doing Business Rigidity of Hours Index [0-100] 
 
Source: Doing Business Databank 
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Box II.3: Computation of the Rigidity of Hours  Index (RHI) 
 
The rigidity of hours index has 5 components: (i) whether there are restrictions on night work; (ii) whether there 
are restrictions on weekly holiday work;(iii) whether the workweek can consist of 5.5 days; (iv) whether the 
workweek can extend to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for 2 months a year to respond to a seasonal 
increase in production; and (v) whether paid annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer. For questions (i) and 
(ii), when restrictions other than premiums apply, a score of 1 is given. If the only restriction is a premium for 
night work and weekly holiday work, a score of 0, 0.33, 0.66 or 1 is given according to the quartile in which the 
economy’s premium falls. If there are no restrictions, the economy receives a score of 0. For questions (iii), (iv) 
and (v), when the answer is no, a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise a score of 0 is assigned. For example, Egypt 
does not impose restrictions on night work (a score of 0), nor on weekly holiday work (a score of 0), allows 6-day 
workweeks (a score of 0), permits 50-hour workweeks for 2 months (a score of 0) and requires paid vacation of 
30 working days (a score of 1). Averaging the scores and scaling the result to 100 gives a final index of 20 for 
Egypt. 
 
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/   
 
Work Hours and Annual Leave  
 
15.  In most MENA countries, the length of a legal workday is 8 hours per day (48 hours a week) 
but overtime work is commonly practiced. Almost in all MENA countries, an 8-hour workday is a rule, 
except Oman in which a standard workday is 9 hours. The typical workweek in manufacturing is still six 
days in most MENA countries. The standard work week is longer than 40 hours (up to 48 hours a week) 
in several countries in the region, including in Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza 
(Table A7 in the Annex). Some countries have restrictive regulation on overtime work. For instance, in 
Iran workers cannot be required to work overtime. In Lebanon, overtime is allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances according to the law. In Saudi Arabia, the Labor Office will prohibit excessive hours, and 
the worker cannot be required to work overtime. In practice, however, overtime work in MENA is 
commonly practiced, especially in the informal sector. To illustrate this point, Table II.1 presents the 
distribution of the “normal” weekly hours of work for formal and informal workers in Egypt, Iraq, and 
Yemen. In the formal sector, the share of workers working more than 48 hours per week (normally) is 
approximately 24 percent in Egypt, 18 percent in Iraq, and 30 percent in Yemen.  
Table II.1: Normal Hours of Work per Week [Formal vs. informal workers] 
  Egypt  Iraq  Yemen 
   Formal  Informal  Formal  Informal  Formal  Informal 
% 0-30 hrs  2.1  5.1  23.9  10.5  9.7  9.9 
% 30-48 hrs  73.9  37.2  58.3  57.2  60.2  37.7 
% 48-60 hrs  7.3  11.5  8.9  19.6  14.9  24.8 
% 60 hrs & longer  16.7  46.2  8.9  12.7  15.3  27.6 
Source: Authors using Yemen 2006 Household Budget Survey, Egypt’s 2006 Labor Market Panel Survey, and Iraq’s 
2007 Household Socio-Economic Survey. 
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16.  Labor legislation in most MENA countries sets up limits (and compensation) for overtime 
work, but these regulations are hardly enforced. Typically overtime can be between 2 and 4 hours per 
day, or 12 hours per week (Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza). In Djibouti, the labor law limits overtime 
to 5 hours per week. Beyond that, the worker must have permission from the Inspector of Labor. In 
most cases, the workweek cannot exceed a maximum of 60 hours per week and 12 hours per day (Table 
A7 in the Annex).  According to results in Table II.1, about half of the workers who claim to work 
overtime claim to actually work more than 60 hours per week, which constitutes a longer shift than that 
allowed by law. In the formal sector, the situation is even worse with 40 to 60 percent of all workers in 
Egypt, Yemen, and Iraq claiming to work overtime. In all MENA countries, overtime premium has set up 
by law varying between 25 and 75 percent (except in Djibouti in which the premium is established by 
collective agreement). Due to high levels of non-compliance, many of the workers working long shifts (in 




17.  Labor legislation in most MENA countries is silent as far as night work is concerned although 
long periods of night work can be detrimental to the health of workers. Regulation in MENA is quite 
flexible concerning night work. Mandatory pay premium for night work has been established only in 
Iran, Oman, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen  (Table  A7 in the Annex). Night work 
arrangements are discussed in the ILO Night Work Convention No. 171 from 1990. The  following 
definitions are given in this Convention: (a) the term night work means all work that is performed during 
a period of not less than seven consecutive hours, including the interval from midnight to 5 a.m., to be 
determined by the competent authority after consulting the most representative organizations of 
employers and workers or by collective agreements; and (b) the term night worker means an employed 
person whose work requires performance of a substantial number of hours of night work which exceeds 
a specified limit. This limit shall be fixed by the competent authority after consulting the most 
representative organizations of employers and workers or by collective agreements. Article 8 of the 
Convention states that compensation shall recognize the nature of the night work. Many countries in 
the region could consider revising their night work regulation along these lines.  
 
18.  In regards to annual leave, regulation in most MENA countries is generous as compared to 
international benchmarks. The Doing Business database allows monitoring the mandatory paid annual 
vacation (in working days) after 20 years of continuous employment. Based on the data, annual leave 
arrangements are quite generous in most of the countries in the region. In Djibouti, Egypt and Yemen, 
the annual leave is up to 30 working days; 28 working in Iraq; and 26 working days in Saudi Arabia (Table 
A8 in the Annex). The shortest mandatory annual leave is in Lebanon at 15 working days, which is the 
minimum recommended by the ILO Convention No. 132 (Box II.4). For comparison, in the EU15 states, 
mandatory paid annual leave after 20 years of continuous employment in a private sector firm varies 
between 20 working days in Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands to 25 working days in most 
other countries (Kuddo, 2009).  
                                                           
11  In EU15 countries, the maximum number of weekly overtime hours varies widely, from two in Spain to 15 in the 
Netherlands, based on a standard 40-hour workweek (Boeri and van Ours 2008). In many EU countries, there is no 




Box II.4: Basic principles of a paid annual leave under  ILO Convention (Revised) No. 132 from 1970 
 
(i)   Every person shall be entitled to an annual paid holiday of a specified minimum length. The holiday shall in 
no case be less than three working weeks for one year of service;  
(ii)    A person whose length of service in any year is less than that required for the full entitlement shall be 
entitled in respect of that year to a holiday with pay proportionate to his length of service during that year; 
(iii)   A minimum period of service may be required for entitlement to any annual holiday with pay. The length of 
any such qualifying period shall not exceed six months; 
(iv)   Public and customary holidays, whether or not they fall during the annual holiday, shall not be counted as 
part of the minimum annual holiday with pay; 
(v)   Periods of incapacity for work resulting from sickness or injury may not be counted as part of the minimum 
annual holiday with pay; 
(vi)   Every person taking the holiday shall receive in respect of the full period of that holiday at least his normal 
or average remuneration; 
(vii) The division of the annual holiday with pay into parts may be authorized by the competent authority or 
through the appropriate machinery in each country… One of the parts shall consist of at least two 






19.  Maternity leave is an important public policy measure to protect the health of the mother and 
child during the final months of pregnancy and the first few months after delivery. However, extended 
maternity leave can potentially affect women’s labor market participation adversely. A long period of 
leave may reduce the attachment of women to the labor market and can lead to an actual or perceived 
erosion of skills. Employers may be reluctant to hire or promote women of child-bearing age due to the 
associated direct and/or indirect costs (e.g., replacement workers) of maternity leave, particularly for 
extended leave (UNICEF 1999). Concerning maternity leave provisions, it should be kept in mind that the 
labor market situation in most MENA countries differs significantly from the developed countries, as far 
as female labor is concerned. With a few exceptions (such as Kuwait, Qatar, United Emirates – which are 
countries that enjoy a participation of migrant women in their domestic labor markets), female 
employment in MENA remains low (between 12 and 30 percent) for international standards (Figure II.5). 
A large portion of female employees work in civil/public services; still, most employed women are 
engaged as contributing family workers or own-account workers (e.g., do not enjoy social protection 
benefits as specified in the labor law).  
 
20.  Most MENA countries offer some form of maternity protection; but benefits are not generous 
for international benchmarks. The ILO Maternity Protection Convention No. 183 suggests that a woman 
to whom this Convention applies should be entitled to a period of maternity leave of not less than 14 
weeks (Box II.5). 
12
                                                           
12 Convention No. 183 was ratified by 18 countries none of which are from MENA. 
Although formally not binding to provisions of a Convention, maternity leave of 14 
weeks has been established in Algeria and Morocco. In other MENA countries, the normal duration of 
the leave is shorter, being the shortest in Tunisia (30 days) and in Bahrain (45 days) (See Table A9 in the 32 
 
Annex). While in some countries, such as Iran, the main labor law covers all working women, in most 
other countries, separate laws govern particular groups of female workers (civil servants and public 
employees are typically covered by separate, and usually more generous provisions). For example, in 
Kuwait, the regular maternity leave lasts 30 days before and 40 days after confinement. A woman who 
takes maternity leave forfeits her right to  annual leave. In comparison, civil servants have more 
generous provisions: (i) a delivery leave on full pay, starting on the day of confinement or if hospitalized 
before confinement, from the day of hospitalization; (ii) a four-month maternity leave after confinement 
on half pay; (iii) an unpaid special parental leave, maternity or child care leave for a child under the age 
of six of a period of at least six consecutive months and a maximum of four years. In Tunisia, while the 
usual maternity leave is 30 days, female civil servants are entitled to 60 days of maternity leave (and 
may also take up to 4 months of postnatal leave after the expiry of maternity leave – a so called optional 
maternity leave). Some countries have established certain restrictions on maternity leave provisions. For 
example, in Egypt, a woman worker may not obtain maternity leave more than twice throughout her 
period of employment. In Libya, a female employee should have completed at least six months' 
continuous service with the same employer in order to be entitled to maternity leave. 
13
Figure II.5: Female Employment to Population Ratio (15+) [2008] 
 
 
Source: Authors using World Bank’s WDI and ILO KILMnet datasets 
                                                           
13 For comparison, in all EU15 countries, pregnant employees and mothers are entitled to a period of rest before 
and after confinement. Currently the duration of paid maternity leave is less than 100 days in Germany, Ireland 
and Portugal. In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands the expectant mother is entitled to six weeks of leave 
before confinement, and in Austria and Greece to eight weeks. In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, eight 
weeks of this rest is optional for the employee following confinement. In Greece and Luxembourg, the rest period 
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Box II.5: International Standards Regarding Maternity Leave Entitlements 
 
Basic international standards regarding maternity leave entitlements are laid down in the ILO Maternity 
Protection Convention No. 183 from 2000, and Maternity Protection Recommendation No. 191 from the same 
year.  In particular, the Convention calls for: 
 
• Each Member shall, after consulting the representative organizations of employers and workers, adopt 
appropriate measures to ensure that pregnant or breastfeeding women are not obliged to perform work 
which has been determined by the competent authority to be prejudicial to the health of the mother or the 
child, or where an assessment has established a significant risk to the mother's health or that of her child; 
• On production of a medical certificate or other appropriate certification, as determined by national law and 
practice, stating the presumed date of childbirth, a woman to whom this Convention applies shall be 
entitled to a period of maternity leave of not less than 14 weeks. Maternity leave shall include a period of 
six weeks' compulsory leave after childbirth; 
• The prenatal portion of maternity leave shall be extended by any period elapsing between the presumed 
date of childbirth and the actual date of childbirth, without reduction in any compulsory portion of 
postnatal leave; 
• On production of a medical certificate, leave shall be provided before or after the maternity leave period in 
the case of illness, complications or risk of complications arising out of pregnancy or childbirth; 
• Cash benefits shall be provide provided at a level which ensures that the woman can maintain herself and 
her child in proper conditions of health and with a suitable standard of living.  
• In order to protect the situation of women in the labor market, benefits in respect of the leave shall be 
provided through compulsory social insurance or public funds, or in a manner determined by national law 
and practice. An employer shall not be individually liable for the direct cost of any such monetary benefit to 
a woman employed by him or her without that employer's specific agreement. 
• It shall be unlawful for an employer to terminate the employment of a woman during her pregnancy or 
absence on leave or during a period following her return to work to be prescribed by national laws or 
regulations, except on grounds unrelated to the pregnancy or birth of the child and its consequences or 
nursing.  
• A woman is guaranteed the right to return to the same position or an equivalent position paid at the same 
rate at the end of her maternity leave. 
• A woman shall be provided with the right to one or more daily breaks or a daily reduction of hours of work 
to breastfeed her child.  
 
Recommendation No. 191 adds the following: (i) Provision should be made for an extension of the maternity 
leave in the event of multiple births; (ii) To the extent possible, measures should be taken to ensure that the 
woman is entitled to choose freely the time at which she takes any non-compulsory portion of her maternity 
leave, before or after childbirth; and (iii) A woman should be entitled to return to her former position or an 
equivalent position paid at the same rate at the end of her leave. The period of leave should be considered as a 




21.  In most MENA countries, employers cover the direct and indirect costs of maternity leave, 
thus providing them incentives to refrain from hiring female employees. An important aspect of 
maternity leave provisions is who bears the costs. Due to direct and indirect costs to employers, an 
extensive usage of such entitlements may lead to restrictions in the hiring of potential mothers. In 
several countries in the region, such as in Algeria, Iraq, and Morocco, the cost of maternity benefits is 
covered by the social security system. Although in such situations the employer does not bear direct 
costs for maternity leave, it also does cause inconveniences associated with the  need to find a 34 
 
replacement for the female worker, or to secure a workplace upon the worker’s return. In most MENA 
countries, however, it is the employer who has to cover direct and indirect costs. While for civil servants 
and public employees the source of relevant expenditures is the government budget – central or local –, 
for small private businesses, maternity benefits might be a significant burden, and businesses might be 
hesitant to employ young women (Box II.6). Paternal and Parental leave are options to promote gender 
equality are to reduce the “variable” cost of hiring female workers. These policies aim at encouraging 
gender equality by sharing the cost (and the responsibility) of infant care between both parents. 
Paternity leaves are targeted at men around the time of a child’s birth. Parental leaves, generally longer, 
are more flexible leaves that are available to families who to families who want to care for their children 
without putting them in day care at a young age.  Well designed paternity/paternal leaves can enhance 
gender equality by reducing the variable cost of hiring women, increase female labor force participation 
(by allowing more flexible arrangements between work and home-care), and promote more 
involvement of father in child upbringing. 
 
Box II.6: Maternity Insurance Reform in Jordan  
 
The Jordanian labor law grants women ten weeks of employer-paid maternity leave, daily hour permission for 
breastfeeding mothers and up to one year of unpaid leave for care of newborn.  However, the fact that the full 
cost of the maternity benefit is borne by the employer creates disincentives for employers to hire women and 
impedes female access to the labor market. This may well be contributing to the very low level of female 
participation (as low as 13 percent) in the private sector labor market in Jordan. The Jordanian Parliament 
recently passed a broad social insurance reform law based on a proposal prepared by the Social Security 
Corporation (SSC). The proposal includes reforms in administration and finance of the SSC, work injuries 
insurance, maternity insurance, unemployment insurance, as well as old age, disability and death insurance. The 
maternity insurance reform entails the financing of maternity benefits through payroll taxes applied on all 
workers, regardless of gender. Both employers and employees contribute to a ‘Maternity Fund’ that will be 
managed by the SSC. The benefit is introduced at the cost of 0.75% of payroll. This measure, which will start 
implementing in the near future, is expected to increase incentives to hire women, encourage women to join 
the labor force, and limit discrimination in the labor market. 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
 
22.  In addition to maternity leave entitlements, pregnant women and mothers with children are 
protected in many other ways. Consistent with the ILO Convention No. 183, in Lebanon, under the 
Labor Code, it is prohibited to terminate the employment of a pregnant woman or send her notice 
during her maternity period or when she is on leave on grounds of childbirth. The same guarantees are 
promulgated in labor legislation in Libya in which it is prohibited to dismiss a woman or terminate her 
contract during maternity leave or any extension thereof. The law should be explicit with regard to other 
social guarantees as well. For example, pregnant or breast-feeding women should not be employed to 
carry out difficult or hazardous jobs, which jeopardize the health of the mother and child. Night work 
should be prohibited for pregnant women, women who are on postnatal leave, and women having 
children, say, under the age of three. Finally, it is important to create a flexible and widespread network 
of childcare options to ensure equal opportunities for women in the market economy (since childcare 
facilities are limited in most MENA countries, the burden of rearing a child lays heavily on the shoulders 
of women). 35 
 
CHAPTER III.  Firing Regulations in MENA  
 
This chapter provides an overview of firing regulations in MENA. Compared to international benchmarks, 
firing regulations in MENA are rather strict. While the termination of workers due to redundancy is 
legally authorized  in all MENA countries, most countries have complex regulations that require 
notification, justification, and approval for dismissals. In some countries, employers are even required to 
comply with stipulated obligations to reassign and/or retrain workers after termination. Since most 
MENA countries lack unemployment insurance, severance pay regimes (some of which are  quite 
generous) remain in place.  Balance between economic efficiency and worker protection could be 
achieved if governments set as an overarching goal “to protect the income of workers as opposed to 
protect particular jobs” through the expansion of unemployment insurance schemes. Excessive 
regulation and firing costs can deter employers from hiring workers and is often associated with higher 
levels of unemployment.  
 
Difficulty of Firing 
 
1.  If labor legislation hinders firms’ ability to adjust their workforce in response to business-cycle 
fluctuations, firms may hire workers informally to avoid severance costs and increase flexibility. The 
law may impose strict procedural requirements for redundancy of one or more workers for economic 
reasons—such as prior approval by the labor authority. Such requirements, while created with the 
intention to protect workers from abuse or to provide a safety net, may hinder the employer’s capacity 
to adjust in periods of economic crisis. Indeed, under some regulation regimes, when it comes to making 
employment decisions for economic reasons, these requirements can give the authorities—not 
employers—the power of discretion. Excessive regulation and firing costs can deter employers from 
hiring workers in the first place. International evidence indicates that reducing the complexity and costs 
of dismissals for economic reasons is a first step toward encouraging formal job creation (World Bank 
2009a). In the context of this policy note, difficulty of firing will be measured by the “Difficulty of 
Redundancy Index” (DRI) as calculated in the Doing Business (2010) Databank (Box III.1). The index 
reflects the extent to which regulation requires notifications/justifications for dismissal, the approval 
requirements for termination of a redundant worker or a group of redundant workers, any stipulated 
obligations to reassign/retrain workers after termination, and other priority rules for redundancy and 
reemployment. Results indicate that the DRI in Non-GCC MENA countries (on average) is the highest in 
the world. Within MENA, the DRI is low in GCC countries (Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab 
Emirates);  and somehow aligned to international standards in Iraq, Qatar,  WBG, Yemen, Djibouti, 
Lebanon, and Algeria. At the same time, Iran, Syria, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia display a high 
DHI for regional and international benchmarks (suggesting more rigid dismissal regulations) (Figure III.1).   
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Box III.1: Computation of Difficulty of Redundancy Index (DRI) 
 
The difficulty of redundancy index has 8 components: (i) whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for 
terminating workers; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a government agency) to 
terminate 1 redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party to terminate a group of 9 
redundant workers; (iv) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate 1 redundant 
worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant 
workers; (vi) whether the law requires the employer to reassign or retrain a worker before making the worker 
redundant; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (viii) whether priority rules apply for 
reemployment. For the first question an answer of yes for workers of any income level gives a score of 10 and 
means that the rest of the questions do not apply. An answer of yes to question (iv) gives a score of 2. For every 
other question, if the answer is yes, a score of 1 is assigned; otherwise a score of 0 is given. Questions (i) and 
(iv), as the most restrictive regulations, have greater weight in the construction of the index. In Tunisia, for 
example, redundancy is allowed as grounds for termination (a score of 0). An employer has to both notify a third 
party (a score of 1) and obtain its approval (a score of 2) to terminate a single redundant worker, and has to 
both notify a third party (a score of 1) and obtain its approval (a score of 1) to terminate a group of 9 redundant 
workers. The law mandates retraining or alternative placement before termination (a score of 1). There are 
priority rules for termination (a score of 1) and reemployment (a score of 1). Adding the scores and scaling to 
100 gives a final index of 80. 
 
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/   
 
 
Figure III.1: Doing Business Difficulty of Redundancy Index [0-100] 
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2.  The termination of workers due to redundancy is legally authorized in all MENA countries, but 
with various restrictions in most cases. In most countries, the employer is obliged to notify a third party 
(typically the Ministry of Labor; the Labor Inspectorate, or workers’ representatives) before terminating 
one redundant worker. Notification of a third party is not necessary only in Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates. In Oman, there is no mandatory notification, but in practice employers 
notify the labor department to prevent employees for not signing dismissal notice. The most rigid 
legislation in this regard is in Bahrain where an employee can unilaterally request the Ministry of Labor 
to reach an amicable settlement with the employer.  If a settlement is not reached, the Ministry of Labor 
refers the matter to the High Court. In six countries in the region (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
and Tunisia) employers need not only to notify, but also to consult (and/or seek approval) a third party 
regarding individual dismissals (see Table A10 in the Annex). Other countries have to meet undertake 
certain procedures after dismissing a redundant workers. For instance, retraining and/or reassignment 
obligations are stipulated in the labor law in countries like Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Five countries 
have legal provisions on priority rules for re-employment as well (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and 
Tunisia). For example, in Lebanon, a redundancy dismissal shall take into consideration the worker’s 
seniority, competence, age, family and social situation.  
 
3.  In order to dismiss one redundant worker the approval of a third party is requested in Egypt, 
Iran, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia but also in Morocco for staff representatives. These requirements 
seriously hinder the employer's ability to adjust workforce according to labor market needs. The laws 
are even more restrictive regarding group redundancies. When the employer plans to execute collective 
dismissals from work, in half of MENA countries, he/she is obliged not only to inform a third party but 
also to consult, typically the labor authorities or employees’ organization recognized as the 
representative of the employees. Only in Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates 
employers do not need a third party agreement before terminating a group of 9 redundant but 
nonunionized workers (see Table A10 in the Annex). 
 
4.  Overall, enterprise restrictions on terminations in many MENA countries are considerable. 
Although ILO international conventions promote avoidance and minimization of terminations, especially 
those without just cause, employers ought to be reasonably free to choose the most suitable employees 
without state direction or interference (Box III.2). These priority rules for dismissals may conflict with 
the economic needs of the company. Over burdensome requirements, while created with the intention 
to protect workers from abuse or to provide a safety net, may hinder the employer’s capacity to adjust 
in periods of economic crisis and also growth in labor demand. Economic efficiency and worker 
protection could be achieved if governments set as an overarching goal “to protect the income of 
workers as opposed to protect particular jobs” through, for instance, the expansion of unemployment 
insurance schemes and/or active labor market policies. An appropriately designed unemployment 
insurance scheme can provide adequate protection to workers in the context of a more flexible labor 
market. Some countries in MENA, especially those with high levels of youth unemployment, should 
consider  less rigid employment regulation  (which implies lower “job” protection )  while providing 
security to employees – especially vulnerable groups – in order to preserve social cohesion and stability. 38 
 
Box III.2: ILO Termination of Employment Convention No. 158 from 1982.   
 
The Convention states that the employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason 
for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service. The employment of a worker shall not be 
terminated for reasons related to the worker's conduct or performance before he/she is provided an 
opportunity to defend against the allegations made, unless the employer cannot reasonably be expected to 
provide this opportunity. A worker whose employment is to be terminated shall be entitled to a reasonable 
period of notice or compensation in lieu thereof unless guilty of serious misconduct, that is, misconduct of such 
a nature that it would be unreasonable to require the employer to continue employment during the notice 
period.  
 
As far as consultation of workers’ representatives is concerned, the Convention suggests that when the 
employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature, the 
employer shall: (a)  provide the workers' representatives concerned in good time with relevant 
information including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number and categories of workers 
likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations are intended to be carried out; (b)   give, 
in accordance with national law and practice, the workers' representatives concerned, as early as possible, an 
opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken to avert or to minimize the terminations and measures to 
mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned such as finding alternative 
employment. The Convention also states that applicability of consultations may be limited to cases in which the 
number of workers whose termination of employment is contemplated is at least a specified number or 
percentage of the workforce (e.g., to group redundancies). 
 
The ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation No 166 (1982) suggests a package of measures that 
should be considered with a view to averting or minimizing terminations of employment for reasons of an 
economic, technological, structural or similar nature. These might include, inter alia, restriction of hiring, 
spreading the workforce reduction over a certain period of time to permit natural reduction of the workforce, 
internal transfers, training and retraining, voluntary early retirement with appropriate income protection, 
restriction of overtime and reduction of normal hours of work. Also, where it is considered that a temporary 
reduction of normal hours of work would be likely to avert or minimize terminations of employment due to 
temporary economic difficulties, consideration should be given to partial compensation for loss of wages for the 






5.  Firing costs  involve  notice requirements, severance payments,  and penalties due when 
terminating a redundant worker. A review of the literature indicates that firing costs reduce the extent 
of employment adjustment to economic shocks: during a downturn, firing costs reduce the number of 
layoffs, while during an upturn, hiring is curbed because of the possibility of having to lay off workers in 
the future (Hamermesh, 1993). Therefore, the price of job security provisions has been the basis of a 
great deal of policy debate (see Botero et al 2004). In the context of this policy note, firing costs will be 
measured by the “Redundancy  Cost Indicator” (RCI) as  calculated in the Doing Business (2010) 
Databank. The indicator measures the cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments and 
penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of salary. If the redundancy 
cost adds up to 8 or fewer weeks of salary and the worker can benefit from unemployment protection, a 
score of 0 is assigned for the purposes of calculating the aggregate ease of doing business ranking. If the 39 
 
redundancy cost adds up to 8 or fewer weeks of salary and the worker cannot benefit from any type of 
unemployment protection, a score of 8.1 weeks is assigned for the purpose of calculating the aggregate 
ease of doing business. If the cost adds up to more than 8 weeks of salary, the score is the number of 
weeks. One month is recorded as 4 and 1/3 weeks.
14
 
 Results indicate that the RCI in MENA (on average) 
is lower than that in South Asia and Sub-Saharan African; similar to that in Latin America, and higher 
than that in OECD, ECA, and East Asia. Within MENA, the RCI is low for international benchmarks in Iraq, 
Oman, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Lebanon. All other countries display a high RCI for regional and 
international benchmarks (Figure III.2).   
Figure III.2: Doing Business Redundancy Cost Indicator [In Weeks of Salary] 
 
Source: Doing Business Databank 
                                                           
14 In Egypt, for example, an employer is required to give 3 month’s notice before a redundancy termination, and 
the severance pay for a worker with 20 years of service equals 27.5 months of wages. Altogether, the employer 
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Advance Notices 
6.  Advance notice is a means to give workers ample warning of future layoffs and thus facilitate 
job search.  While the employee has no obligation to give a reason for notice of termination, the 
employer has to justify the cause for contract termination according to the law. If an employer wants a 
rapid reduction in its workforce, then both severance pay and notice pay for period must be paid. In that 
case, notice payments look much like severance payments. The existence of a notice period de facto 
extends the duration of labor market adjustment, and it is obviously a cost-factor for employers, 
especially when multiple employees have to be dismissed. The ILO Termination of Employment 
Recommendation No. 166 from 1982 suggests that: (i) the employer should notify a worker in writing of 
a decision to terminate his employment, and that (ii) a worker who has been notified of termination of 
employment or whose employment has been terminated should be entitled to receive, on request, a 
written statement from his employer of the reason or reasons for the termination.  
 
7.  In most MENA countries, the notice period is reasonably short - typically one month but three 
month in Egypt and four months in Lebanon. That is no notice period in Iraq, and in Iran, there is only 
an obligation of the worker to give notice period to the employer (see Table 11 in the Annex). The EU15 
countries  have quite different practices regarding advance notice but most countries have more 
generous entitlements in this regard. For example, a worker with 20 years of service at the employer can 
receive a notice varying from 30 calendar days in Spain, eight weeks in Ireland, and two months in 
Portugal and France but up to six months in Finland, Germany and Sweden. The ILO Termination of 
Employment Recommendation No. 166 also suggests that the worker should, for the purpose of seeking 
other employment, be entitled to a reasonable amount of time off without loss of pay, taken at times 
that are convenient to both parties. This is the practice in many ECA countries. For example, in Poland, 
within a minimum two week period of notice, the worker has the right to take two to three days leave 
from work for the purpose of seeking new employment depending on the duration of the notice period. 
In Lithuania, this length of time should not be less than ten percent of the employee’s rate of working 
time during the term of notice. Time off from work shall be granted in accordance with the procedure 
agreed between the employee and the employer (Kuddo 2009). 
Severance Pay 
8.  Since most MENA countries lack unemployment insurance, severance pay regimes remain in 
place. Mandatory severance pay is an attractive system in developing countries because it requires little 
administrative capacity to monitor the unemployment status, does not require the collection of social 
contributions, and, given that it is paid as a lump sum, does not affect the efficiency of job search 
(Vodopivec, 2004). In MENA, most countries have some type of severance pay regime, with the 
exception of Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, and Oman; where lay off workers are covered by the social security 
system  (see Table A11 in the Annex). Severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of 
employment is the most generous in Egypt, 27.5 months of pay (collective dismissals), followed by 20 41 
 
months of pay in Iran, and 555 calendar days in United Arab Emirates.
15
 
 At the same time, only a few 
countries in MENA region have unemployment insurance (UI) systems, namely, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and 
Kuwait (see Table A12 in the Annex). Even in countries with UI systems in place – at least legally – the 
system is hardly functioning. In Egypt, for instance, during the period 2001-07 less than 350 people per 
year received benefits (Angel-Urdinola et al, 2010). The factors contributing to the low utilization are 
lack of public awareness about UI benefits among plan members, restrictive eligibility conditions, the 
difficulty of (and the stigma attached to) documenting a “just-cause” firing decision, and low overall lay-
off risk among covered open-ended contract employees. In all EU countries, the state assumes a large 
part of the risk through income support in the case of unemployment (unemployment benefits) and 
measures to help workers find a new job (active labor market policies). Seven EU15 countries require 
employers to make severance payments to eligible dismissed workers, and eight countries leave this to 
collective agreements and private contracting.  
9.  In some MENA countries, severance payments are linked to seniority. A distinguishing feature 
of severance-pay laws is whether the benefits do or do not vary with the seniority of the terminated 
worker. All the countries in the region with severance pay entitlements use a sliding scale connected to 
years of employment. By design, a sliding-scale country is more generous to its more senior workers 
than its less senior workers. In general, however, sliding-scale countries mandate more generous 
benefits overall than do fixed-benefit countries.  Also workers with shorter tenure (young, females) are 
cheaper to dismiss and are expected to suffer higher dismissal probabilities in downturns (Boeri et al 
2008). The most generous seniority-related benefit is in Iran and West Bank and Gaza where longevity of 
service reaps rewards: the severance formula is one month of wages for each complete service year. In 
Egypt, since a small scale redundancy is not allowed, there is no legally specified severance formula.   
 
10.  Severance regimes have more drawbacks than they have benefits. First of all, these payments 
offer only limited pooling of unemployment risk (within firms, not across them). Secondly, they do not 
protect workers against the duration of the risk. Those workers who remain unemployed for a long time 
might not receive enough funds to endure the unemployment spell. Last but not least, the proportion of 
all workers covered by severance payments tends to be low, as one of the pre-requisite seems to be for 
these workers to have formal indefinite contracts in the private sector (Pages et al, 2007).  High 
severance pay and lengthy notice periods make layoffs more costly and the process more difficult for 
employers. Studies also show that high severance pay contributes to part-time employment, self-
employment and informality. There is also mounting evidence that severance pay reduces inflows to 
and outflows from unemployment. By doing so, it contributes to longer unemployment spells that is, a 
stagnant unemployment pool (OECD 2004 and 1999). 
                                                           
15 According to the ILO Termination of Employment Convention No. 158 from 1982, a worker whose employment 
has been terminated shall be entitled, in accordance with national law and practice, to (a) a severance allowance 
or other separation benefits, the amount of which shall be based inter alia on length of service and the level of 
wages, and paid directly by the employer or by a fund constituted by employers' contributions; or (b) benefits from 
unemployment insurance or assistance or other forms of social security, such as old-age or invalidity benefits, 
under the normal conditions to which such benefits are subject; or (c) a combination of such allowance and 
benefits. 42 
 
11.  Many countries are increasingly relying on unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA). 
An appropriately designed unemployment insurance scheme can provide adequate protection to 
workers in the context of a more flexible labor market. Balance between economic efficiency and 
worker protection could be achieved if the government set as an overarching goal “to protect the 
income of workers as opposed to protect particular jobs” (often unproductive).  Labor market 
characterized by high informality, weak enforcement, and moral hazard issues (like many in MENA) 
could benefit from a model of UI that relied on unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA). 
Traditional UI schemes tend to be abused in developing countries. The general operation of UISAs is 
straightforward, transparent, and less prompt to abuse  (although they allow for only limited risk 
pooling, as savings in the accounts can deplete faster than what is needed). Employers deposit some 
specified fraction of each worker’s earnings in a special individual savings account on a regular basis. In 
Chile workers are also required to make regular contributions to their accounts. Upon separation 
workers can make withdrawals from their savings accounts as they deem fit (some programs allow 
access before separation for health, education, and housing). UISAs are a relatively new program, 
although Brazil has used them since the 1960s. More recently, several other Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) have introduced UISAs 
(Robalino and Sanchez-Puerta, 2008). 
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Table A0: Main Employment Indicators Used in the Policy Note 
U = Unemployed population 
E = Employed population 
WAP = Population aged 15 to 64 
LF = Population in the labor force (U + E) 
Indicator  Description  Calculation 
LFP rate (%)  Share of labor force in the WAP  LF (U + E)     ÷     WAP 
Employment rate (%)  Share of employed in the WAP  E     ÷     WAP 
Unemployment rate (%)  Share of unemployed in the labor 
force 
U     ÷     LF 
Inactivity rate (%)  Share of WAP not in the labor market  WAP - LF     ÷     WAP 
Joblessness rate (%)  Share of WAP not working, excluding 
students 
U + (WAP - LF) – Enrolled  
 ÷  WAP 
Informality Rate (%)  Share of employed workforce making 
contributions to social security 
 
Eurostat - Statistical Office of the European Communities 
Unemployed persons  All persons 15 to 74 years of age (for years 1995-2000, all person 16 to 74 years in Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Iceland, and Norway) who were not employed during the reference 
week, had actively sought work during the past four weeks and were ready to begin working 
immediately or within two weeks. The duration of unemployment is defined as the duration of a 
search for a job or as the length of the period since the last job was held (if this period is shorter 
than the duration of search for a job). 
Employed persons  All persons who worked at least one hour for pay or profit during the reference week or were 
temporarily absent from such work.  
Unemployment rate  The number of people unemployed as a percentage of the labor force. The labor force is the 
total number of people employed and unemployed. 
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Indicates the ratio of the labor force to non-institutional working-age population (age 15-64). 
Unemployment  All persons above a specified age, who during the reference period were: 
•  Without work, i.e. were not in paid employment or self-employment during the reference 
period. 
•  Currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment 
during the reference period. 
•  Seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid 
employment or self-employment. The specific steps may include registration at a public or 
private employment exchange; application to employers; checking at worksites, farms, 
factory gates, market or other assembly places; placing or answering newspaper 
advertisements; seeking assistance of friends or relatives; looking for land, building, 
machinery or equipment to establish own enterprise; arranging for financial resources; 
applying for permits and licenses, etc. 
WDI - World Development Indicators 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Indicates the ratio of the labor force to working-age population (age 15 and above). 
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Table A1: The Main Law and/or Other Legal Acts on Labor 
Country  Main Labor Law 
Algeria  Act 90-11 of April 21, 1990, relating to labor relations, supplemented and amended on 
January 11, 1997 
Act No. 90-02 of 6.2.1990, amended and supplemented, relating to the prevention and 
settlement of labor disputes 
Bahrain  Labor Law for the Private Sector, Law No. 23 of 1976 (the "Labor Law") 
The Regulations for Implementing the Bahrain Labor Law, Ministerial Orders 13 - 27 of 
1976 
Legislative Decree No. 14 of 1993 with respect to Amending The Labor Law for the 
Private Sector Promulgated by Legislative Decree No. 23 of 1976 
Djibouti  Act No. 133/AN/05/5 on the Labor Code (Act of 31/01/06) 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Labor Law No. 12/2003 & Relief Fund Law No 156/2002  
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Labor Act 1990 
Iraq  Act. No. 71 of 1987, dated July 27, 1987 (the Iraq "Labor Code")  
Jordan  Civil Code No. 43 for the Year 1976 ("CC") 
Labor Law No. 8 for the Year 1996  
Social Security Law No. 19 for the Year 2001 
Resolution of the Minimum Wage Committee for the Year 2006 
Kuwait  Law No. 38/1964 Concerning Labor in the Private Sector 
Lebanon  The Lebanese Code of Labor dated September 23rd, 1946. 
Morocco  Labor Code promulgated by law n° 65-99, dated September 11 2003 and in force since 
June 8 2004.  
Its related application decrees and departmental orders (adopted between December 
2004 and November 2005)  
Oman  Royal Decree No. 35/2003 issuing the labor law 
Qatar  Labor Law No. 14 of 2004 
Saudi Arabia  The Labor Law, issued under Royal Decree No. M/51 dated 23/8/1426H (corresponding 
to 26 September 2005).  It took effect on 26 April 2006.   
Syrian Arab Republic  Labor law No. 91 of 1959 (the "Labor Law") 
Tunisia  Law N° 66-27 of April 30, 1966 promulgating the Labor Code, amended by Law No. 94-
29 of 21/02/1994 and Law 96-62 of 15/07/1996;  
Departmental Order of 29/05/1973 of the Minister of Social Affairs approving the 
Master Agreement, amended by appendixes 1, 2a 
United Arab Emirates  Federal law No. 8 of 1990 on Regulating Labor Relations  
Ministerial Decision No 49/1 of 1980 
Ministerial Decision No. 27/1 of 1991 
Ministerial Decision No. 467 of 2005 
Ministerial Resolution No. 401 of 1997 
West Bank and Gaza  Palestinian Labor Law No. 7, for the year 2000 
Yemen, Rep.  Labor Law No. 5/95 
Social Insurance Law No. 26/91 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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Table A2: Other major labor laws in the areas of individual and collective labor 
relations by country.  
Country  Labor Law 
Algeria  Executive Order No. 2000-392, 6.12.2000 fixing the guaranteed national minimum wage 
Order 97/03, 11/01/1997 
Prescription 96/21 of 09/07/1996 
Order 96/12 of 10.6.1996 
Legislative Decree No. 94-09, 26.5.1994 on preserving jobs 
Bahrain  The Trade Union Law of 2002 
Djibouti   
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Social Insurance Law No 79/75 
Iran, Islamic Rep.    
Iraq  Retirement and Social Security Law for Laborers No. 39 of 1971; 
Foreign Labor Regulation No. 18 of 1987 
Jordan    
Kuwait  Private Sector Law No. 38 of 1964 
 Amiri Decree No. 17 for the year 1959 enacting Foreigners Residence Law- 
 Ministerial Resolution No. 640 for the Year 1987 concerning the Executive By-law of the 
Foreigners Residence Law 
Law No. 28 for the year 1968  
Lebanon  Decree No. 17386 dated September 2, 1964 governing collective agreements, 
conciliation and arbitration 
Morocco  Law No. 1-93-16, dated March 23 1993, governing training agreements 
Oman   N/A 
Qatar   N/A 
Saudi Arabia  N/A 
Syrian Arab Republic  Legislative decree No. 49 of 1962 
Social Security law No. 92 of 1959 
Law No. 50 of 2004 
Bar organization law issued by the legislative decree No 84 in 1968  
Tunisia  Law No. 94-28 of 21/02/1994 as amended, governing professional disease and work 
accidents  
Law No. 93-10 of 17/02/1993 on professional training 
Decree No. 93-1049 of 03/05/1993 on incentives for employment of youth 
United Arab Emirates  N/A 
West Bank and Gaza  N/A 
Yemen, Rep.  N/A 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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Table A3: Number of ILO conventions ratified by country. 
   Number of ILO conventions 
ratified 
Number of ILO core 
conventions ratified 
Core ILO conventions not 
yet ratified 
Algeria  54  8  - 
Bahrain  9  4  87, 98, 100,138 
Djibouti  58  8  - 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  63  8  - 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  13  5  87, 98, 138 
Iraq  61  7  87 
Jordan  23  7  87 
Kuwait  19  7  100 
Lebanon  49  7  87 
Morocco  50  7  87 
Oman  4  4  87, 98, 100, 111 
Qatar  6  5  87, 98, 100 
Saudi Arabia  15  5  87, 98, 138 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
50  8  - 
Tunisia  52  8  - 
United Arab 
Emirates 
9  6  87, 98 
West Bank and 
Gaza 
-  -  - 
Yemen, Rep.  29  8  - 
Source: ILO 53 
 
Table A4: Regulations on Fixed-Term Contracts (FTC) 





What is the maximum duration of a 
FTC (in months), not including any 
renewals? 
What are the rules for renewing a FTC beyond the 
original maximum term? 
What is the maximum 
cumulative duration 
of a FTC relationship 
(in months), including 
all renewals?  
Algeria  Yes  No Limit. But the requires that the 
duration is specified, otherwise the 
contract will be considered permanent 
No limit  No limit 
Bahrain  No   No limit.   No specific provisions on renewals.  If no renewal is 
agreed but the contracting parties continue to abide by it 
after its expiry it shall be deemed to have been renewed 
by both parties for an indefinite period under the same 
terms 
No limit 
Djibouti  Yes  12  Renewable once  24 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  No  No limit, but employee may terminate 
after 5 years  
No limit  No limit 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  No  No limit.   N/A  No limit 
Iraq  Yes  No limit.   No limit  No limit 
Jordan  No  60  No limit  No limit 
Kuwait  No  60  No limit  No limit 
Lebanon  No  No limit but after 24 months worker is 
treated as indefinite term for purposes of 
severance pay  
No limit but renewal beyond 24 months leads to 
treatment as indefinite term worker for purposes of 
severance pay 
24 
Morocco  Yes   12  No renewal except for starting a new enterprise or new 
product, in which case one renewal is allowed. 
12 
Oman  No   No limit.  No limit  No limit 
Qatar  No  60  N/A  No limit 
Saudi Arabia  No  No limit.  One renewal is allowed, if the original contract includes a 
clause allowing renewal. However, if the total term after 
one renewal reaches 3 years, the contract automatically 
becomes open-ended 
No limit 
Syrian Arab Republic  No  No limit.  If renewed, the contract term will change to unlimited.  No limit 
Tunisia  No  48 months including renewals  The term should not exceed 4 years   48 
United Arab Emirates  No  48  No limit  No limit 
West Bank and Gaza  No  24  No renewals allowed after 24 months   24 
Yemen, Rep.  No  12  N/A  No limit 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 54 
 
Table A5: Minimum wage arrangements in selected MENA countries 
  Setting the MW   Coverage  Categories of workers with 




Algeria  the government sets a national 
minimum wage (SMNG) that 
applies to all sectors, following a 
period of consultation with the 
social partners 
Civil and military national 
defense personnel, 
magistrates, state 
officials, along with the 
personnel of public 
establishments of an 
administrative nature are 
not covered by the 
national minimum wage 
rate. Separate legislation 
is enacted concerning 
these workers. 
Apprentices receive a pre-salary, 
which is paid by the State and is the 
equivalent of 15% of the national 
minimum wage rate. This pre-salary 
is paid for 6 months if an 
apprenticeship is for a period of 24 
months or less. If the 
apprenticeship is for more than 24 
months, the pre-salary is paid for 12 
months. 
The legislation does 
not set forth how 
frequently the 
national minimum 
wage rate should be 
adjusted. 
Labor inspectors ensure 
the provisions of the Law 
concerning labor relations 
are adhered to. 
Lebanon  The national minimum wage rate 
is fixed by the government in 
accordance with the report made 
by the tripartite Commission on 
the Cost of Living Index comprising 
representatives of the 
government, employers, wage 
earners and salary-earners. 
The minimum 
wage applies to 
all workers, both 
salary and wage-
earners, of at 
least 20 years of 
age in both the 
public and private 





Domestic servants, workers in 
agricultural corporations not 
connected to trade and industry, 
workers in family businesses 
employing solely family members, 
workers younger than 20 years of 
age, and casual or temporary 
workers in public administration. 
There is no specific 
time-period provided 
in the legislation. 
Instead, minimum 
wage rates are 
adjusted whenever 
the economic 
situation renders a 
review necessary. 
The labor inspection 
service ensures that the 
Labor Code is adhered to. 
Morocco  National minimum wage rates are 
set by the government for: 
employees and workers carrying 
out agricultural work (SMAG); and 
employees and workers in the 
industrial and commercial sectors, 
and in liberal professions (SMIG), 
following the opinion of the most 
representative employees' and 
employers' organizations. 
Minimum wage provisions 
apply to all persons who 
are party to an 
employment contract: in 
industry; commerce; 
professional occupations; 
and agricultural work 
the government sets two national 
minimum wage rates for: 
employees and workers carrying out 
agricultural work (SMAG); and 
employees and workers in the 
industrial and commercial sectors, 
and in liberal professions (SMIG). 
Apprentices may be paid wages that 
are lower than the minimum wage 
rates. 
The legislation does 
not set forth how 
frequently minimum 
wage rates should be 
adjusted. 
Labor inspectors verify that 
all labor legislation 
(including the payment of 
minimum wage rates to 
employees in industry, 
commerce and professional 
occupations, and 
agriculture), is complied 
with. 




Table A5 cont.: Minimum wage arrangements in selected MENA countries 
  Setting the MW   Coverage  Categories of workers with 




Saudi Arabia  Although the legislation provides 
for the establishment of a 
minimum wage system by the 
government, in fact no minimum 
wages have been implemented. 
Wages are fixed in individual 
agreements between the worker 
and the employer. 
       
Tunisia  Minimum wage rates are set by 
the government. Minimum wage 
rates for workers other than those 
employed in the agricultural sector 
(SMIG) and for workers in the 
agricultural sector (SMAG) are set 
and revised by the government in 
a decree, following consultations 
with workers' and employers' 
organizations. In practice, the 
National Committee on Social 
Dialogue is consulted prior to the 
government setting minimum 
wage rates. 
The minimum wage rate is 
the level set for workers 
in positions that do not 
require a professional 
qualification. 
There is a distinction between 
minimum wage rates for 
agricultural and non-agricultural 
workers. A minimum wage rate is 
set for workers younger than 18 
years of age, which is lower than 
the regular minimum wage rate. 
Currently, the minimum age rate for 
juvenile workers is 85% of the rate 
applicable for adults. 
The legislation does 
not set forth how 
frequently rates 
should be adjusted; 
however, in practice 
rates are updated 
each year. 
Labor inspectors ensure 
that the provisions of the 
Labor Code are adhered to. 
Source: ILO (http://www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/minimumwages) 
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Table A6: Regulation on Minimum Wages (MW) 
   What is the MW for a 19-year-old  
Worker in his/her first job? 
Ratio of MW  
to Average Wage 
Algeria  12,000 dinars per month  0.30 
Bahrain  N/A  - 
Djibouti  N/A   - 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Agreement by the parties (in practical terms, 165 
L/month) 
0.11 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  2,635,200 Rials per month or 87,840 Rials per day for 
Persian year 1388 (March 21, 2009 - March 21, 2010) 
0.47 
Iraq  N/A  - 
Jordan  150 JD/month  0.43 
Kuwait  N/A  - 
Lebanon  500000 LL/month  0.40 
Morocco  10,14 DH/hour  0.72 
Oman  120 RO/month for the lowest grade  0.13 
Qatar  No minimum wage mandated by law - QAR 6000 is 
customary 
- 
Saudi Arabia  N/A  - 
Syrian Arab Republic  6250 pounds/month  0.38 
Tunisia  60% of the previous. Apprentice wage scale: 1st  quarter: 
30%; 2nd quarter: 40%; 3rd  quarter: 50%; 4th  quarter: 
60% (if apprenticeship extends beyond one year); 5th  




United Arab Emirates  N/A  - 
West Bank and Gaza  N/A   - 
Yemen, Rep.  The minimum wage for a government employee is YRE 
20,000 / month gross.  The minimum wage for the 
private sector cannot be less. 
0.60 
 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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Table A7: Regulation Concerning Standard Workdays and Overtime. 
   What is the length of 
the standard work day? 
What is the maximum 
overtime limit in normal 
circumstances? 
What is the premium for 
overtime work? 
Algeria  8 hours  8 hours per week   50% 
Bahrain  8 hours a day or 48 hours a 
week. 6 hours a day or 36 
hours a week during 
Ramadan 
Overtime may not exceed 60 hours 
unless the workers occupation 
requires more overtime and 
MOLSA has given its consent. 
25% for daytime overtime and 
50% for nighttime overtime. 
Djibouti  8 hours  5 hours / week. Beyond that, he 
must have permission from the 
Inspector of Labor, but there is a 
maximum of 60 hours per week 
and 12 hours per day 
Established by collective 
agreement 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  8 hours  2 hrs/day   35% during the day; 70% for the 
night 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  8 hours  4 hrs/day. The worker cannot be 
required to work overtime 
40% 
Iraq  8 hours   4 hours/day   50% for daytime overtime, 
100% for night-time overtime  
Jordan  8 hours  N/A  25%, 50% for nighttime 
overtime 
Kuwait  8 hours  2 hours/day   25% 
Lebanon  8 hours/day (48 
hours/week), Saturdays 
included. 
None. Overtime is allowed only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
50% 
Morocco  8 hours  100 hrs/year  25% day work; 50% night; 50%-
100% holidays 
Oman  9 hours   N/A  at least 25% (or compensatory 
leave), 50% for night work, 
100% for weekly or public 
holiday 
Qatar  8 hours day on a 6 day 
week,  6 hours day during 
Ramadan 
2 hours maximum of overtime by 
day (10 hours by day) 
25% for overtime and 50% for 
night overtime and 50% for 
work between 9 pm till 3 am  
Saudi Arabia  8 hours  No limit. However, in practice, the 
Labor Office will prohibit excessive 
hours. The worker cannot be 
required to work overtime. 




8 hours  2 hours/day, 520 hours/year   for daytime overtime: 25%, 
nighttime 50% 
Tunisia  8 hours in a 48 hours’ work 
week 
12 hrs/week   75% for the 48 hours system 
United Arab 
Emirates 
8 hours and 6 hours during 
the month of Ramadan  
2 hours/day  25% normal working hours (if 
overtime is on Fridays, public 
holidays or at night then the 
50% premium for night or 
weekend work applies)  
West Bank and 
Gaza 
8 hours, or 9 hours in 5 
days work week 
12 hours/week   50% 
Yemen, Rep.  8 hours  N/A  50% normal working days, 
100% at night, on the day of 
weekly rest, and on official 
holidays 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 58 
 
Table A7 cont.: Regulation Concerning Standard Workdays and Overtime. 
   How many days are 
there in the typical 
work week in 
manufacturing? 
What is the maximum number of 
working hours allowed in a day? 
What is the 
maximum number 
of working days 
per week? 
Algeria  5 or 6  12  6 
Bahrain  5  11  6 
Djibouti  6  12  6 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  5 or 6  10  6 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  5 or 6  12  6 
Iraq  5  12 hours (8 hours standard + 4 hours 
overtime) 
6 
Jordan  6  11  6 
Kuwait  6  10  6 
Lebanon  6  12  6 
Morocco  5.5  12  6 
Oman  6  9  6 
Qatar  6  10, including overtime  6 
Saudi Arabia  6 (6 is most common in 
manufacturing although 
5-day and 5.5-day 
workweeks also exist) 
11  6 
Syrian Arab Republic  5  10 (8 normal hours + 2 overtime 
hours allowed under limited 
circumstances) 
6 
Tunisia  6  10 hrs but certain categories of 
personnel such as drivers and 
watchmen may work up to 12 hrs 
per day without exceeding 64 hrs 
per week pursuant to an 
authorization from the minister in 
case of necessity to recover the loss 
of time caused by a work 
interruption or the nature of the 
work 
6 
United Arab Emirates  6 (but 5 also exists in 
some workplaces) 
10  6 
West Bank and Gaza  6 (5 days of 8 hours, and 
1 day of 5 hours) 
12 hours taking into account a 9 
hour work day plus overtime. 
6 
Yemen, Rep.  6  12  6 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 59 
 
Table A7 cont.: Regulation Concerning Standard Workdays and Overtime. 
   Can the workweek for a 
single worker extend to 50 
hours per week for 2 
months/year to respond 
to a seasonal increase in 
production? 
What is the mandatory 
pay premium for night 
work (% of salary) 
What is the mandated 
decreased shift time for 
night work? 
Algeria  No  N/A  N/A 
Bahrain  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Djibouti  Yes  No  No 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Yes  No  No 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Yes  35%  N/A 
Iraq  Yes  No  Yes - 7 hours maximum 
Jordan  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Kuwait  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Lebanon  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Morocco  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Oman  Yes  50%  N/A 
Qatar  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Saudi Arabia  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Syrian Arab Republic  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Tunisia  Yes  Yes - the general CBA says 
there is a pay premium, the 
amount of which is to be 





Yes  50%  N/A 
West Bank and Gaza  Yes  N/A  N/A 
Yemen, Rep.  Yes  15%  N/A 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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Table A8: Regulation Concerning Rest and Vacations 
   What is the minimum 
number of hours of rest 
required by law between 
workdays? 
What is the legally 
defined specific weekly 
rest day? 
What is the mandatory 
paid annual vacation (in 
working days) after 20 
years of continuous 
employment? 
Algeria  The law imposes no 
minimum (but typically 
not less than 12 hours) 
Friday, but for 
economically imperative 
reasons, it can be 
another day 
22 
Bahrain  N/A  N/A  20 
Djibouti  12  Friday; exceptions are 
possible as determined 
by ministerial decree 
30 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  14  N/A  30 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  N/A  N/A  24 
Iraq  N/A  No  28 
Jordan  13  Friday  21 
Kuwait  N/A (one hour break 
every 5 hours of work) 
N/A  21 
Lebanon  9  N/A  15 
Morocco  N/A  N/A  24 
Oman  N/A  N/A  22 
Qatar  N/A  N/A  24 
Saudi Arabia  13 hours  Friday  26 
Syrian Arab Republic  14  N/A  21 
Tunisia  10 hrs (12 hrs for women 
and minors) 
N/A  18 
United Arab Emirates  14  Friday  26 
West Bank and Gaza  No explicit limit for rest 
between rest days, but 
maximum 1 hour 
mandatory break every 5 
hours of work 
Friday, but can be made 
another day for work 
reasons 
18 
Yemen, Rep.  N/A  Friday, but can be made 
another day for work 
reasons 
30 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 61 
 
Table A9: Regulation on Maternity Leave in MENA [selected countries] 
  Description of the Scope of Maternity Benefits 
Algeria  Maternity protection covers all employed women except for civil servants and public employees, workers in air and sea transport and fishing 
vessels, home workers, journalists, actors and performers, commercial travelers, athletes and domestic workers, who are covered by separate 
provisions. Medical and cash benefits from the sickness insurance are granted in the event of illness or complications. 
Bahrain  N.A. 
Egypt  Maternity protection under Law No 12, of 2003, covers women working in the Private Sector. Women civil servants, household workers, 
members of the employer's family and agricultural workers are excluded from the scope of application of this law. Civil servants and workers 
employed by public sector bodies are covered by separate legislation. A woman worker may not obtain maternity leave more than twice 
throughout her period of employment. 
Iran  All women workers, trainees and apprentices in industrial and agricultural establishments, mining enterprises, construction, transport 
enterprises, commercial establishments, production units and any other place open to the public. 
Iraq   N.A. 
Jordan  N.A. 
Kuwait  Women workers performing manual or intellectual work. Civil servants, casual and temporary workers and employees, domestic servants and 
owners of small enterprises employing less than five workers are not covered. Female civil servants are covered by separate legislation. Maternity 
protection legislation applies to all female civil servants and includes the following types of leave: (1) A delivery leave on full pay, starting on the 
day of confinement or if hospitalized before confinement, from the day of hospitalization (2) A four-month maternity leave after confinement on 
half pay (3) An unpaid special parental leave, maternity or child care leave for a child under the age of six of a period of at least six consecutive 
months and a maximum of four years.  
Lebanon  Maternity leave under the Labor Code applies to all female salaried employees and wage-earners in commercial, industrial, educational 
establishments and charity foundations. Civil servants, domestic servants, women working in agricultural cooperative establishments which have 
no connection with commerce or industry, and establishments engaging only family members in family undertakings are not covered by the 
Labor Code. 
Morocco  N.A. 
Qatar  N.A. 
Saudi Arabia  N.A. 
Syria  N.A. 
Tunisia  Maternity protection under the Labor Code covers women employed in undertakings engaged in industry, commerce and agriculture, whether 
public or private, denominational or non-denominational as well in the liberal professions, women working in handicraft establishments, 
cooperatives, non-trading corporations and trade unions and associations of any kind. Women employed in family undertakings are excluded. 
Female civil servants are covered by separate legislation 
United Arab Emirates  N.A. 
Yemen  N.A. 
Source: ILO (http://www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/maternityprotection) 
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Table A9 cont.: Regulation on Maternity Leave in MENA [selected countries] 
  Normal duration  Compulsory leave  Financing of benefits 
Algeria  14 consecutive weeks  At least one week 
before confinement 
Social security system, which is financed by the contributions of 
employers and persons covered by the social insurance act. 100 per 
cent of the daily wage for 14 weeks. However, the amount of 
maternity benefits shall not be lower than 8 times the net hourly rate 
of the national minimum guaranteed wage. 
Bahrain  45 days    Employer 
Egypt  90 days taken before or after confinement  45 days after 
confinement 
Social security and the employer 
Iran  Women covered by the Labor Code are entitled 
to ninety days maternity leave, of which 45 days 
must, if possible, be taken after confinement. For 
breastfeeding mothers, up to three children, the 
maternity leave is four months. 
45 days after 
confinement 
N.A. 
Iraq   62 days  N.A.  Social security 
Jordan  10 weeks   N.A.  Employer 
Kuwait  Thirty days before and 40 days after 
confinement. A woman who takes maternity 
leave forfeits her right to annual leave 
N.A.  The employer. One hundred per cent of pay for the normal duration 
of maternity leave (70 days). 
Lebanon  7 weeks including the prenatal period and the 
period following the childbirth 
N.A.  The employer. Cash benefits are also provided by the Social Security 
Act. The Social Security Act provides that cash benefits will be paid by 
the National Social Security Fund. One hundred per cent of normal 
wage. 
Morocco  14 weeks  N.A.  Social security; 100 % of earnings 
Qatar  50 days   N.A.  Employer 
Saudi Arabia  10 weeks  N.A.  Employer 
Syria  50 days  N.A.  Employer 
Tunisia  30 days, on production of a medical certificate. 
Female civil servants are entitled to 2 months of 
maternity leave. They may also take up to 4 
months of postnatal leave after the expiry of 
maternity leave (optional maternity leave). 
N.A.  Under the Social Security Act, women who have at least 80 days of 
contributions during the four calendar quarters preceding that in 
which the birth takes place are eligible to the cash benefit. For civil 
servants, the full salary is paid during maternity leave and half-salary 
during the optional period of additional postnatal leave (up to four 
months). For women covered by the Labor Code, the daily wage is 
calculated on the basis of the wage earned during a calendar quarter 
chosen among the four quarters preceding the leave. The average 
daily wage is equal to 1/90 of this wage. 
United Arab Emirates  3 months  N.A.  Employer 
Yemen  60 days  N.A.  Employer 
Source: ILO (http://www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/maternityprotection) 63 
 
Table A9 cont.: Regulation on Maternity Leave in MENA [selected countries] 
  Extension  Non-discrimination and employment security 
Algeria  N.A.  Any provision in collective agreements, conventions or labor contracts 
stipulating any kind of discrimination in employment, based on sex or family 
status among other reasons, shall be null and void. 
Bahrain  N.A.  N.A. 
Egypt  A woman working in an enterprise employing 50 workers or 
more may obtain 2 years' unpaid leave to care for her child 
(optional maternity leave). This leave is only granted twice 
during her period of employment. Civil servants may take this 
type of leave three times during the entire period of 
employment. 
N.A. 
Iran  Maternity leave is extended by 14 days for multiple births. For 
breastfeeding mothers, up to three children, the maternity 
leave is extended to five months in the event of twin birth and 
twelve months in the event of multiple birth, with the full 
amount of her previous earnings paid 
N.A. 
Iraq     N.A. 
Jordan    N.A. 
Kuwait  One hundred unpaid consecutive or non-consecutive days after 
maternity leave because of any illness arising out of pregnancy 
or confinement that has been medically certified.  
N.A. 
Lebanon  N.A.  Under the Labor Code it is prohibited to terminate the employment of a 
pregnant woman or send her notice during her maternity period or when she 
is on leave on grounds of childbirth or sick leave. However, dismissal with 
notice is permitted during these periods if the woman works elsewhere. 
Morocco  N.A.  N.A. 
Qatar  N.A.  N.A. 
Saudi Arabia  N.A.  N.A. 
Syria  N.A.  N.A. 
Tunisia  15 days due to sickness as a result of pregnancy or confinement. 
A medical certificate is required. 
An employer may not dismiss a woman on the grounds that she has 
suspended her work during the period before and after her confinement. If 
she is dismissed, the employer is liable to pay damages provided that she 
informed her employer of the reason for her absence. Notice of dismissal is 
prohibited up to a maximum of 12 weeks after maternity leave if the woman 
produces a medical certificate that she is incapable of returning to work 
because of an illness arising out of her pregnancy or confinement. 
United Arab Emirates  N.A.  N.A. 
Yemen  N.A.  N.A. 
Source: ILO (http://www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/maternityprotection) 64 
 
Table A10: Regulation Concerning Dismissal of Redundant Worker 
  Is it legal for an employer to 
terminate the employment 
contract of a worker on the 
basis of redundancy? 
Must the employer notify a third party before dismissing 
one redundant worker? 
Does the employer need the 
approval of a third party in 
order to dismiss one 
redundant worker? 
Algeria  Yes  Yes, both notify and consult  No 
Bahrain  Yes  Yes, employee can unilaterally request the Ministry of 
Labor to reach an amicable settlement with the employer.  
If a settlement is not reached then the Ministry of Labor 
refers the matter to the High Court which shall decide. 
No 
Djibouti  Yes  Yes, both notify and consult the Inspector of Labor and, 
where available, the staff representatives 
No 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Yes  Yes, both notify and consult  Yes 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Yes  Yes, both notify and consult  Yes 
Iraq  Yes  Yes, only notify to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs  No 
Jordan  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kuwait  Yes  No  No 
Lebanon  Yes  No  No 
Morocco  Yes  No for normal workers, Yes for staff representatives  No for normal workers, Yes 
for staff representatives 
Oman  Yes  There is no mandatory notification, but in practice 
employers notify the labor dept to prevent employee's 
not signing dismissal notice.  Notification serves in the 
place of signing.  Consultation is not required. 
No 
Qatar  Yes  Yes - only notification to the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs is required. 
No 
Saudi Arabia  Yes  No  No 
Syrian Arab Republic  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tunisia  Yes  Yes, both notify and consult  Yes 
United Arab Emirates  Yes  No  No 
West Bank and Gaza  Yes  Yes, only notify  No 
Yemen, Rep.  Yes  Yes, only notify  No 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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Table A10 cont.: Regulation Concerning Dismissal of Redundant Worker 
  Must the employer notify or consult a third party before dismissing a group of 9 
redundant workers? 
Is there a retraining or reassignment 
obligation before an employer can 
make a worker redundant? 
Algeria  Yes, both notify and consult  Yes 
Bahrain  Yes, employee can unilaterally request the Ministry of Labor to reach an amicable 
settlement with the employer.  If a settlement is not reached then the Ministry of 
Labor refers the matter to the High Court which shall decide. 
No 
Djibouti  Yes, both notify and consult the Inspector of Labor and, where available, the staff 
representatives 
No 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Yes, both notify and consult  No 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Yes, both notify and consult.  No 
Iraq  Yes, only notify to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs  No 
Jordan  Yes, both notify and consult   No 
Kuwait  No  No 
Lebanon  Yes, both notify and consult  No 
Morocco  Yes, both notify and consult  Yes 
Oman  No  No 
Qatar  Yes - only notification to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is required.    No 
Saudi Arabia  No  No 
Syrian Arab Republic  Yes, both notify and consult  No 
Tunisia  Yes, both notify and consult   Yes 
United Arab Emirates  No  No 
West Bank and Gaza  Yes, only notify (Not mandated by law, but necessary in practice to avoid substantial 
penalties for unlawful and unjustified termination.) 
No 
Yemen, Rep.  Yes, only notify  No 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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Table A10 cont.: Regulation Concerning Dismissal of Redundant Worker 
  Are there priority rules that apply to redundancy dismissals 
or lay-offs? 
Are there priority rules that apply to re-employment? 
 
Algeria  Yes  No 
Bahrain  No  No 
Djibouti  No  Yes, the workers dismissed for economic reasons keep for a 
year hiring priority 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Yes  No 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  No  No 
Iraq  No  No 
Jordan  No  Yes 
Kuwait  No  No 
Lebanon  Yes, the final program of redundancy dismissal shall take into 
consideration seniority, competence, age, family and social 
situation. 
Yes, hiring priority within one year from dismissal 
Morocco  Yes  Yes 
Oman  No  No 
Qatar  No  No 
Saudi Arabia  No  No 
Syrian Arab Republic  No  No 
Tunisia  Yes  Yes 
United Arab Emirates  No  No 
West Bank and Gaza  No  No 
Yemen, Rep.  No  Yes 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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Table A11: Regulation Concerning Firing Costs 
  Legal notice period for 
redundancy dismissal after 
20 years of continuous 
employment? 
What is the severance pay formula?  What is the severance 
pay for dismissal after 
20 years of continuous 
employment? 
Algeria  1 month, or as required by 
the collective agreements 
N/A  3 months 
Bahrain  30 days  For a Bahraini national earning above the average monthly salary of 839 BHD, the 
leaving indemnity is calculated over the excess of 4000 BHD monthly salary.  
Therefore no leaving indemnity would be paid. 
N/A 
Djibouti  15 days for workers paid on 
timely basis; 
N/A  12  months 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
1 months for employees, 
workers and laborers; 
Since a small scale redundancy is not allowed, there is no legally specified severance 
formula.  The severance requirement for a collective dismissal is 1 month for each of 




3 months for supervisors and 
managers 
One month per year of employment  20 months 
Iraq  3 months  None  N/A 
Jordan  None  None; the worker would be covered by the social security system  N/A 
Kuwait  1 month  15 days for the first 5 years of work  17.5 months 
Lebanon  1 month  + 1 month for every year thereafter, not to exceed 1.5 years total severance pay  N/A 
Morocco  15 days  None (the limit from 2 to 12 months applies only when there is a misuse of powers)  76.4 weeks 
Oman  4 months  A salary for 96 hr/year - 1st 5 years; 144 hr/year - 2nd 5 years; 192 hr/year - 3rd 5 
years; 240 hr/year - beyond 15 years 
N/A 
Qatar  2 months  None since the worker is covered by the Social Insurance Law.  60 weeks 
Saudi 
Arabia 
30 calendar days  3 weeks per year of service  17.5 months 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
2 months  Half a month’s pay for each of the first five years and one month’s pay for each of 
the subsequent years 
17.5 months 
Tunisia  30 days  Half a month of the last salary for the first 5 years, full month for every year after 
the 5th year 
3 months 
U.A.E  4 weeks  N/A  555 calendar days 
W.B.G  1 month  21 calendar days for each of the first 5 years; 30 calendar days for each year beyond 




30 days  1 month based on the last gross salary for each year worked  3 months 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 68 
 
Table A12: Unemployment Protection Regimes 





How is the unemployment protection 
scheme funded? 
What is the amount of the unemployment benefit and for how long 
does an unemployed worker receive it? 
Algeria  Yes, 
unemployment 
insurance 
Employers 1% of the base of social security 
contributions. Employee 0.50% of the base of 
social security contributions 
Between 75% of the guaranteed national minimum wage (SNMG) and 3 
times the SNMG. Duration: two months per year of contribution 
Bahrain  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Djibouti  No  N/A  N/A 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Yes  The employer at the rate of 2% of the wages 
of the insured persons 
60% of the last wage of the insured person. The indemnity shall continue 
to be paid to the insured person until the day preceding the date of his 
being engaged in an employment, or for a period of 16 weeks whichever 
is earlier. This period shall be extended to 28 weeks if the contribution 
period to this insurance exceeds 24 months. The indemnity shall also be 
paid during the period of  vocational training determined by the 
Manpower office 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Yes  The employer must pay a sum equivalent to 
3% of the salary of each worker during the 
course of employment of each employee. 
Between 55% (or the minimum salary if higher) and 80% of daily wages 
of the person who has been made unemployed. From 6 months to 50 
months depending on circumstances. 
Iraq  No  N/A  N/A 
Jordan  No  N/A  N/A 
Kuwait  Yes  Contributions by employers and Kuwaiti 
Government 
100-300 kd until employed 
Lebanon  No  N/A  N/A 
Morocco  No  N/A  N/A 
Oman  No  N/A  N/A 
Qatar  No  Indemnisation of the employee by the 
employer 
N/A 
Saudi Arabia  No  N/A  N/A 
Syrian Arab Republic  No  N/A  N/A 
Tunisia  No  N/A  N/A 
United Arab Emirates  No  N/A  N/A 
West Bank and Gaza  No  N/A  N/A 
Yemen, Rep.  No  N/A  N/A 
Source: Doing Business (2010) Databank 
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